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painful than other categories of expenses and losses.' To the extent a
phenomenon of tax aversion exists, it imposes several kinds of costs
on society. If people are averse to taxes for reasons above and beyond
the financial losses the taxes represent, they will likely spend more
time and money on tax avoidance than a purely economic analysis
predicts, generating additional deadweight losses for society.2 Even
when people do not pursue avoidance at elevated levels, tax aversion
increases the disutility associated with the payment of the tax. Not
only is this costly in itself,3 but it would also be expected to impact
compliance rates and enforcement costs by raising the perceived
benefits of 4tax evasion relative to the severity and probability of
punishment.
1. See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1878
(1994) ("[T]here may be a phenomenon of 'tax aversion,' akin to but distinct from loss
aversion, whereby individuals attach disproportionate disutility to government extractions
perceived or labeled as 'taxes."'). Despite the intuitive resonance of this concept, we have
uncovered only a handful of studies that use the term "tax aversion." In those limited instances,
authors typically employed the phrase "tax aversion" or "tax avoision" to indicate that their
analysis focused on the overall, added costs and impacts of both illegal "tax evasion" and legal
"tax avoidance," without focusing on the concept of disproportionate disutility that we examine
here. See, e.g., Amy Freedman, Benefiting from Tax Aversion, FIN. SERV. WK. Oct. 15, 1990, at
27; Roger N. Waud, Tax Aversion, Optimal Tax Rates, and Indexation, 43 PUB. FIN. 310
(1988); Hans Geeroms & Hendrik Wilmots, An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax
Avoidance, 40 PUB. FIN. 190, 203 (1985) (using "avoision" term); Rodney Cross & G.K. Shaw,
On the Economics of Tax Aversion, 37 PUB. FIN. 36 (1982). The fuller sense in which we mean
to use the term "tax aversion" is perhaps best captured by the idea of "emotional hazard"
presented as a possible "new source of efficiency cost of taxation" in Ronald Bosman & Frans
van Winden, Emotional Hazardin a Power-to-Take Experiment, 112 ECON. J. 147, 149 (2002).
See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the experimental results presented by
Bosman & van Winden).
2. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 282 (6th ed. 2002) (defining "excess burden" as
"a loss of welfare above and beyond the tax revenues collected," and noting that the phrases
"welfare cost" and "deadweight loss" are also used to denote this cost); David Weisbach, LineDrawing,Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1650-51 (1999)
(analyzing examples of deadweight loss or excess burden in tax transactions).
3. We will later pursue the possibility that disutility associated with taxes might actually
play a functional role in spurring political action. See Part V.A, infra. Absent such a
countervailing instrumental role, disutility represents a social loss.
4. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 183-84 (1968) (presenting an economic model in which the "price" of crime is a
function of the probability and severity of punishment); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340 & n.28 (2001) (applying Becker's analysis that
"individuals will evade when the expected gain from doing so exceeds the expected penalty" to
tax evasion); John S.Carroll, Taxation: Compliance with FederalPersonalIncome Tax Laws,
in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 507, 510 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992)
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While there is a general consensus that most people dislike paying
taxes, 5 more empirical data is needed to determine how, and to what
extent, tax aversion plays a role in taxpayer behavior. If tax aversion
occurs at significant levels, it becomes important to isolate and
explore the constitutive elements of that aversion. A better
understanding of the causes and components of tax aversion could
spur useful innovation in tax design. In this paper, we survey and
mine existing bodies of empirical work for the insights they might
bring to bear on these questions, while constructing a qualitative
research agenda that begins to fill the remaining gaps. To focus our
inquiry, we concentrate primarily on the federal income tax.
This analysis proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we discuss the
phenomenon of tax aversion and consider the need for further study
to pinpoint its dimensions, constituent elements, and effects. In Part
II, we introduce and discuss some of the experimental literature
involving public goods games while working through some stylized
examples. Cooperation can break down in experimental group
contribution settings due to factors like fear and greed-the fear that
others will not contribute, and the greedy desire to free ride on the
contributions of others.6 Other factors, like repeat play and social
proximity of the players, can apparently buffer or counteract these
negative emotions and help to sustain cooperation. 7 Legal scholars

(explaining this "standard economic model" as applied to tax compliance); Michael G.
Allingham & Agnar Sandomo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ.
323 (1972) (formulating static and dynamic economic models for analyzing individual taxpayer
decisions on whether and how much to evade taxation).
5. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Americans Suffer from Negative Mental Attitude While
Doing Taxes, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, April 2001, at 43, 44 (reporting that 66% of those
interviewed in a recent survey indicated that they either "dislike" or "hate" paying taxes, and
that 65% believed the federal income tax they had to pay was "too high").
6. We posit that perhaps more important than either fear or greed in isolation is the fear
of greed-the concern that the greed of others will go unpunished and that one's own
contributions will turn one into a "sucker." See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
7. Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary
Contributions to

Public

Goods,

102

SCANDINAVIAN

J.

ECON.

23,

31

(2000),

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNlD245568_code00 1011 130.pdfabstractid=245
568 (concluding, based on public goods experiments, that the "tendency to cooperate is greater
when subjects anticipate prolonged interaction with others as members of a group"); GARY
CHARNESS ET AL., SOCIAL DISTANCE AND RECIPROCITY: THE INTERNET VS. THE LABORATORY

1-4, 23 (Sept. 13, 2001) (Working Paper Series, available on Social Science Research
Network), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID312141_codeO2O515560.pdf?
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are beginning to recognize that these studies could have important
implications for tax policy, 8 but the hard work remains of translating

the insights of these analyses into the context of a coercive tax
system.
In Part III, we introduce some additional difficulties present in
real-world taxpaying situations. Some of these difficulties relate to
the contested ends of taxation, including intentional redistribution,
while others relate to the structure of the tax system. In Part IV, we
turn to the anthropological and sociological literature for a richer and
deeper understanding of the notion of reciprocity. Such an
understanding helps us see whether and how to address the sources of
tax aversion within a real-world taxation system. Some of the
interactive features that mediate concerns about free riding and that
sustain cooperation in cohesive small-group settings are necessarily
absent in the federal taxation context. Yet, it still may be possible to
make use of certain features conducive to cooperation, or
approximations thereof, in the federal taxation context.
In Part V, we discuss some possible ways of testing, refining, and
applying empirical insights relating to tax aversion in the federal
taxation context. Two features present in many real-world reciprocal
contexts are the transparency of reciprocal moves and the ability of
parties to communicate their preferences through the granting or
withholding of contributions. We sketch a change in the interface
encountered by the taxpayer that attempts to incorporate these
features without otherwise effecting a substantive change in tax law.
We propose this idea as a possible experimental design model to
advance innovation in tax design and lay the groundwork for further
experimentation in, and dialogue about, tax design.
abstracted =312141; ARMIN FALK ET AL., INFORMAL SANCTIONS 31-32 (U. of Zurich, Inst. for

Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 59, 2000), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
delivery.cfm/SSRNID245568_code00 10 11130.pdfabstractid=245568 (testing for reciprocal
behavior in Internet and classroom laboratory experiments and concluding that reciprocity

decreases with increased social distance but is not eliminated).
8. See, e.g.,

Kahan, supra note 4, at 340-44 (noting relevance of public goods

experiments for tax-enforcement policy).
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I. MAPPING TAx AVERSION

It borders on the insipid to observe that most people dislike paying
taxes. Perhaps for this reason, virtually no systematic work has been
undertaken to gauge whether taxes are more aversive than other sorts
of costs or losses. To be sure, a great deal of study has focused on
questions of tax compliance. 9 Additional studies have examined how
taxpaying might be made to feel fairer or less burdensome to
taxpayers.10 Notably, scholars have observed that reactions to survey
questions about taxation are mutable and depend on the framing of
the question'-a fact that problematizes the study of taxpayer
attitudes, even as it provides clues to the nature and tractability of tax
aversion. While this body of existing research concerning compliance
burdens and perceptions of equity touches on and implicates
instances of tax aversion, we think the phenomenon of aversion
warrants a more direct exploration.
A functional definition of the kind of tax aversion we wish to
investigate is the amount by which one's aversion to a tax exceeds
the economic cost of the tax. A symptom of this kind of tax aversion
would be a willingness to expend more on tax avoidance (or risk
more through tax evasion)1 2 than is warranted by the economic cost
9. E.g., ALAN LEWIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TAXATION 123-87 (1982); TAX EVASION:
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (Paul Webley et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter TAX EVASION];
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992);
Carroll, supra note 4; John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The
Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (1995).
10. E.g., Gregory A. Carnes & Andrew D. Cuccia, An Analysis of the Effect of Tax
Complexity and Its Perceived Justification on Equity Judgments, 18 J. AM. TAX'N ASS'N 40
(1996); RONALD G. CUMMINGS ET AL., CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF TAX COMPLIANCE

BEHAVIOR (Ga. State Univ., Int'l Studies Program Series, Working Paper No. 01-3, 2001),
available at http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispwp003.pdf; Thomas M. Porcano & Charles E.
Price, Some Evidence on the Association Between Judgment Criteriaand FairnessPerceptions,
4 ADVANCES IN TAX'N 183 (1992), Martha L. Wartick, Legislative Justification and the
Perceived Fairness of Tax Law Changes: A Referent Cognitions Theory Approach, 16 J. AM.
TAX'N ASS'N 106 (1994).
11. E.g., LEWIS, supra note 9, at 47-49 & tbl.4.2 (discussing notorious malleability of
survey responses and presenting table entitled "How to Record the Fiscal Preferences You
Want from Attitude Surveys and Public Opinion Polls").
12. TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 2 (distinguishing tax avoidance, which involves legal
efforts to reduce tax liability, from tax evasion, which involves illegal efforts to reduce taxes).
For additional studies of issues in tax avoidance and evasion, see, for example, BRUNO S. FREY
& LARS P. FELD, DETERRENCE AND MORALE IN TAXATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Ctr. for
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of the tax. A substantial body of experimental literature indicates that
people are willing to incur positive costs to keep others from getting
away with conduct they perceive as unfair, 3 and we believe that a
similar dynamic might operate to heighten avoidance and evasion in
the tax context.
An example will illustrate the point. Imagine that Borg can reduce
his tax bill either legally (by consuming tax deductible items) or
illegally (by fabricating deductions). 14 He can also simply pay the
tax. In making the decision about avoidance, he should compare the
tax-discounted price of the deductible item in question with the utility
it generates for him. For example, if he is in a 36% marginal tax
bracket and contemplates attending a conference that costs $1000 in
real dollars (and if we further assume that his tax situation allows the
full deduction of this amount), he should rationally attend the
conference only if attending is worth more than $640 to him.' 5 If he
subjectively values attending the conference at just $600, but attends
because he wants to take the tax deduction, this suggests either
irrationality, innumeracy, or an additional factor that makes taxes
more painful than the dollar figure suggests (or, alternatively, that
makes a tax savings of $360 more attractive to him than that dollar
figure indicates). We call that additional factor "tax aversion."
Do people actually take tax deductions beyond the economically
justified point or otherwise engage in nonoptimizing behavior with
regard to tax avoidance? Some have intuited that this indeed occurs,
and anecdotal evidence supports the proposition. 16 For example,
Econ.

Studies

& Ifo Inst.

for Econ.

Research,

Working

Paper No. 706,

2002),

http://papers.ssm.ocm/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNfD341380_code021021590.pdf?abstractid=341
380; J. Slemrod & S. Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK

OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423-70 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002); J. Andreoni et al.,
Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998).

13. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing studies involving dictator,
ultimatum, and power-to-take games).
14. See supranotes 9, 12 (citing studies of compliance, evasion and avoidance).
15. We use the thirty-six percent marginal tax rate here for illustrative purposes only;
actual marginal tax rates have been changing as a result of recent legislation. See I.R.C. § 1(i).
Other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code address the availability of deductions. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 67(a) (establishing a floor for certain itemized deductions); I.R.C. § 68 (setting limits
on allowable itemized deductions for taxpayers above a certain income). For purposes of this
simple illustration, we ignore the complications associated with those limits.
16.

E.g.,

McCaffery,

supra note

1, at 1914-15

(suggesting people may consume
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Texas has an annual "sales tax holiday"-a few days each August
during which shoppers may purchase selected items free of sales tax.

News articles covering the event note the huge crowds that descend
upon stores to take advantage of this opportunity and the fact that
some individuals make rather extraordinary expenditures in
connection with it.17 The savings are not large, with a sales tax of

8.25% in cities such as Austin, and some commentators quite
reasonably speculate that merchants do not offer prices as low as they

might in the absence of the tax break. However, monetary savings
may not be the only factor motivating the behavior. As one shopper
articulated, "there's something to be said for finally beating the

government at something." 18
However, we know of no empirical study of such manifestations
of tax aversion.' 9 Designing such a study would not be easy. For
example, consider the difficulties that would be involved in
attempting to measure whether an effective price change resulting
from a change in tax treatment had a larger or smaller impact on
consumer demand than a similar price change resulting from market
deductible items beyond the point of optimality); id. at 1915 (making a similar point regarding
the use of unprofitable tax shelters).
17. Rod Kurtz, A Buyers' Bonanza, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN at A1, A 10 (Aug. 3,

2002) (describing expenditures such as staying in hotels in order to be closer to the stores when
they open).
18. Id. at AI0 (quoting Pamela Krisan, a shopper taking advantage of the Texas "tax
holiday"). Of course, one might argue that attitudes towards taxation in Texas, a state that has
long resisted enacting an income tax, do not necessarily typify those that prevail nationwide.
However, organized events such as sales tax holidays and time-limited amnesty offers for
taxpayers incorporate the characteristics of "inversion" or "reversal" rituals that anthropologists
have found to be a frequent component of secular rituals within stratified societies. Such
inversion rituals serve to relax normal societal and legal rules within a bounded context and
time period. By relaxing, or reversing, the existing legal rules within such limited frameworks,
sales tax holidays and amnesties can serve to reinforce and emphasize the applicability and
enforceability of those rules at all other times. VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS 172-78
(1995); Evon Z. Vogt, Rituals of Reversal as a Means of Rewiring Social Structure, in THE
REALM OF THE EXTRA-HUMAN: IDEAS AND ACTION 201-11 (Agehananda Bharati ed., 1976);

see also Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 219 (1996) (finding tax amnesty effective
when "taxpayers perceive that the amnesty will be followed immediately by substantially
increased enforcement of the law").
19. In a 1994 article, Edward McCaffery noted this lack of empirical work on the question
of excessive avoidance behaviors: "I am aware of no study that pins this particular phenomenon
down. Thus, this discussion remains anecdotal for now." McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1915.
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forces. 20 The unavailability of existing data suitable for these
purposes and the difficulty in formulating a method for successfully
collecting such data outside of a controlled laboratory experiment
present daunting challenges. Nevertheless, beginning to imagine what
such a study might look like can help set the stage for innovative
research in this area.
Another possible manifestation of tax aversion might be increased
evasion. Recall that Borg has the ability to fabricate deductions rather
than actually consume deductible items. In deciding whether or not to
fabricate deductions, many factors could play a role, but on a strict
economic analysis we imagine that Borg will compare the expected
cost of fabricating the deduction (a 'product of the probability of
detection multiplied by the costs of defending himself and paying
penalties for this sort of tax evasion) with the expected tax benefit to
be derived from the fabrication. 2' If Borg fabricates a deduction for
$1,000, it yields him $360 in tax benefits. To be "worth it" for Borg
to break the law, the expected value of punishment for violating the
law must be less than $360. If Borg runs a one percent chance of
being caught and expects to suffer defense and punishment costs of
$40,000 if caught, the expected value of such costs equals $400.22
20. For an overview of some of the methodological considerations and complications
associated with the design of empirical studies, see E. Allan Lind, John E. Shapard, & Joe
Shelby Cecil, Appendix B: Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice
System, in EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 81, 88-112 (1981).

21. See ROSEN, supra note 2, at 326-27 (presenting a more detailed account of an
individual's tax evasion calculation).
22. This hypothetical probability of detection exceeds actual audit rates in recent years.
For taxpayers with less than $100,000 in annual income, the probability of being subjected to a
federal income tax audit was 1.60% in fiscal year 1995, 1.58% in 1996, 1.19% in 1997, 0.92%
in 1998, 0.86% in 1999, 0.45% in 2000, and 0.55% in 2001. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 43 (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub3970_2-2002.pdf. The audit rates in these years
for taxpayers with annual incomes of $100,000 or more were 2.97% in 1995, 3.2 1% in 1996,
2.74% in 1997, 2.01% in 1998, 1.40% in 1999, 0.96% in 2000, and 0.79% in 2001. Id.
Moreover, the penalty amount we have posited far exceeds the monetary penalties actually
imposed. The actual penalty levels under current law call for payment of the tax due, accrued
interest on that amount, plus a penalty of twenty percent of that tax amount if underpayment
resulted from negligence or substantial understatement of taxes due. I.R.C. § 6662. The penalty
level increases to seventy-five percent of the tax amount due if the taxpayer underpaid as a
result of fraudulent conduct. Id. § 6663(a). Our hypothetical assumes that Borg would incur
substantial additional costs in defending himself against an audit and subsequent legal
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Because this cost exceeds the monetary savings associated with the
fabricated deduction, we do not expect a rational Borg to fabricate.
However, if we posit that another factor makes the fabricated
deduction worth more than what the dollar value suggests, the
calculation might change.
How might we measure whether people are actually adding in an
additional "kicker" associated with tax aversion in making evasion
decisions? It might seem that they are doing exactly the opposite.
Relatively few people evade taxes, even though we might expect the
combination of low audit rates and low penalties to make evasion
attractive from the standpoint of rational calculation.23 Yet people
likely overestimate the probability and severity of punishment, and
also give unknown amounts of weight to intangible factors such as
guilt and shame in their decisionmaking.2 4 Because tax evasion is
notoriously difficult to detect and to distinguish from unintentional
taxpayer errors, 21 it is hard to gain much insight into subjective
taxpayer calculations based on detected instances of evasion. A
number of controlled laboratory experiments have attempted to
measure and evaluate tax evasion.26 However, evasion in these
contrived27 settings arguably does not compare with real-world
evasion. It is impossible to accurately estimate the perceived

proceedings, and would also suffer significant intangible disutility associated with detection and
punishment.
23. Overall compliance rates in recent years have exceeded eighty-three percent.
CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 10, at 3 n.3.
24. Id. at 3-4; see ROSEN, supra note 2, at 328 (noting the "psychic costs of cheating").
25. LEWIS, supra note 9, at 124-26; Paul Webley et al., The Problem of Measurement, in
TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 29, 30-35; Carroll, supranote 4, at 509.
26. See supranotes 9, 12 (citing studies on evasion and compliance enforcement efforts).
27. For example, participants may view the experimental interface as a game and may not
view decisions about evasion with the same moral seriousness (or with the same fear of
humiliation and punishment) as they might in the real world. Paul Webley et al., The Subjects'
View, in TAX EVASION, supranote 9, at 114; Paul Webley & S. Halstead, Tax Evasion on the
Micro: Significant Simulations or Expedient Experiments?, 1 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 87 (1986);
see also Susan Long & Judyth Swingen, The Conduct of Tax-Evasion Experiments: Validation,
Analytical Methods, and Experimental Realism, in TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 128, 136-37
(observing that tax evasion experiments do not involve the threat of non-financial punishments
such as imprisonment). On the other hand, some participants may shun evasion behaviors in the
experimental setting out of a desire to appear "honest" to the experimenter or otherwise provide
responses they believe the researchers desire. See, e.g., Webley et al., The Subjects' View,
supra,at 114, 117.
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severity of punishment that confronts taxpayers (which includes
individual subjective valuations of being imprisoned or fined, as well
as any dollar amounts paid in penalties or defense costs) or
taxpayers' perceptions of the probability that a given fabrication will
be detected.2 8 A qualitative study that attempts to tap into the
calculations made by tax evaders would provide invaluable help in
this regard.
Heightened avoidance and evasion do not adequately capture all
of the costs associated with tax aversion. Some taxpayers have little
ability to avoid or evade taxes or may reach limits in their ability to
take advantage of these tactics. For others, even inflated measures of
benefits derived from avoiding or evading taxes provide insufficient
triggers for avoidance or evasion because the costs still loom higher.
Hence, Borg might neither evade nor avoid, but instead simply suffer
the disutility associated with tax aversion. We might also wish, then,
to measure the increased disutility that accompanies tax aversion,
even when not manifested in changed avoidance or evasion
behavior.29
The theoretical question is easy enough to state: whether taxes are
more painful than other economically equivalent events. An
economically equivalent event would be a gain or a loss through
some means other than taxation that has an equal dollar value to the
gain or loss associated with the tax payment and the corresponding
benefits received. However, a difficulty arises when we attempt to
pin down whether a given taxpayer has enjoyed a gain or suffered a
loss as a result of a tax payment. If we show a rational individual a
world in which no tax-financed goods exist (including no
government, no courts, no police, no national defense, no schools, no
roads, and so on) and ask her how much she would pay to move from
28. Taxpayers may also make different calculations regarding evasion depending on
whether they view themselves as facing a loss (taxes due at year's end) or a gain (refund
already forthcoming). For a recent review of the literature on this point, see Chris Guthrie,
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1115, 1142-45 (2003).

29. It is also possible that tax aversion not immediately manifested behaviorally due to
lack of opportunity might translate into behavioral manifestations at a later time when
opportunities become available to the individual taxpayer. Another theoretical possibility,
unexplored to our knowledge, is whether frustrated tax aversion might be redirected into
noncompliant behavior in other interactions with the government, such as benefit claims.
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this chaotic world to one in which our current slate of tax-financed
goods exists, the answer would surely exceed the amount that the
individual pays in taxes. 30 However, it does not follow that individual
taxpayers would not choose, at the margin, to pay lower taxes and
receive fewer services, provided they could pick and choose which
services to continue receiving and which ones to jettison.
A potentially more useful approach brackets the theoretical
question by identifying the economic events that occupy the extreme
ends of a spectrum of financial transactions: market exchanges and
uncompensated losses. On the one hand, we expect that a tax would
generate more aversion than would a market transaction. Unlike a
market transaction, a taxpayer does not choose her owed payment
(except in the limited sense suggested by opportunities for evasion or
avoidance), and a tax payment does not yield an immediate, tangible
object of exchange. On the other hand, a tax is not quite the same as a
theft or other uncompensated loss; it does go somewhere and yields
at least some benefits (ambient or otherwise) 3 for the taxpayer. It
seems that a tax occupies a middle ground between loss and
exchange-an intermediate status further complicated both by the
possibility of free riding and the lack of any rhetorical connection (at
least with respect to the federal income tax) between payments made
and benefits received.
Do people perceive taxes more like losses, exchanges, or some
third mental category of expenses, such as bad gambles or mandated
purchases? Or do they attempt to mentally disaggregate the portion of
their taxes that corresponds to identifiable benefits from the extra
amount they must pay to "carry" or cross-subsidize full or partial free

30.

See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 16 (2002) (arguing

that "the baseline for determining the benefits of government is the welfare a person would
enjoy if government were entirely absent; the benefit of government services must be
understood as the difference between someone's level of welfare in a no-government world and
their welfare with government in place"); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 210 (1985)
(observing that "a court could place all legislative initiatives past and future in a single hopper
and proclaim that the benefits and burdens are always proportionate, thereby gutting the takings
clause for general regulation").
31. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participationin the Production of
Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (differentiating between the consumption
good of public education or safety and the composite good that results from the communitywide pattern of consumption of these goods).
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riders, so that they perceive the tax as a bundle containing some
exchange value and some loss?32 If so, does the fact that free riding

occurs make the loss greater than the number of dollars involved
indicates? Does the fact that one is interacting with the government
change the situation? Does the compulsory nature of the collection
add to the disutility? Surprisingly, few studies address this set of
questions in the tax context.
One possible line of qualitative research into these questions could
use survey questions and interviews to probe the relative degree of
disutility associated with a variety of ambiguous expenditures of a
particular sum of money, all of which straddle the middle ground
between loss and exchange. Such data could help identify the features
that contribute to tax aversion and provide a richer understanding of
how people perceive taxes. While a full experimental design protocol
is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest starting with something
like the survey questions listed in Figure 1.
32. As discussed below, identifying when and whether one is actually subsidizing or
carrying free riders (as opposed to simply purchasing a redistributive public good with ambient
benefits or purchasing social insurance against potential risks) proves to be a difficult and
controversial task.
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Figure 1
Indicate on a scale of I to 4 how much you would be bothered by each of
the following scenarios, assuming (where relevant) that there would be no
way to rectify the problem: (1 = not bothered at all; 2 = slightly bothered; 3 =
significantly bothered; 4 = extremely upset).
On the back of the sheet, please add any explanations or qualifications,
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

suffering a $100 gambling loss at a local casino
missing by one day a sale that discounts a major appliance by $100
accidentally dropping a $100 bill into a storm drain
buying a S100 used computer "as is" and finding that it does not
work
receiving a $100 speeding ticket for going 26 mph in a 20 mph zone
contributing $100, as agreed, to a workplace fund for a terminally ill
colleague and later learning that most people contributed less than
$20 and several people contributed nothing at all
learning that, as a result of a new law, you owe an extra $100 in tax
to the federal government
learning that you paid $100 more than necessary for an original
work by a local artist
paying $100 in dues for a club membership to help pay for club
activities and facilities, where club members who cannot afford the
dues are relieved of the dues requirement or are given subsidized
rates
being required by law to purchase a motorcycle helmet (the cheapest
one costs $100) in order to cycle on public streets

There are some obvious limitations to this' approach. One
significant problem is that the brief scenarios in the survey items
listed in Figure 1 provide only the thinnest of contextual cues.
Research indicates that the surrounding context or "frame" can be
extremely important in processing or "coding" an event.33 For
example, a respondent's reaction to item number one might depend
on how she mentally constructs the context of the imagined gambling
loss-whether she imagines it as a loss occurring in isolation or as
33.

See, eg., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the

Psychology of Choice, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE LAW 304

(Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); Anton Kflhberger, The
Influence of Framingon Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 23, 24-25 (1998).
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one following earlier wins or losses.34 We could make similar points
about many of the other items. Therefore it becomes difficult to
determine whether differential responses to the various scenarios
were merely reactions to different contextual assumptions or mental
frames, rather than to perceived differences in substantive features of
the posited situation.
Another problem arises when different respondents have different
preferences about the specific substantive matters raised in the
scenarios. Attitudes and past experiences related to gambling, to
motorcycles, to the arts, to terminal illnesses, or to speeding tickets
can lead to differential responses that do not necessarily represent
true reactions to the features intentionally planted by the researcher.
For both of these reasons, making sense out of responses requires
the collection of more substantial data in the form of written
comments and follow-up interviews.35 Some studies of taxpaying
have attempted to qualitatively evaluate respondents' reactions to
different tax environments. 36 It would be very useful to extend that
body of qualitative work to encompass other kinds of interactions that
might implicate some of the more troubling aspects of taxpaying.
An alternative way of exploring the phenomenon of tax aversion
consists of examining empirical work in related contexts to isolate
some of the structural and contextual features that might drive or
mitigate tax aversion. Empirical studies indicating that people will
incur positive costs to punish those whom they perceive as acting
unfairly might provide a template for understanding tax aversion,
particularly as manifested in expenditures on tax avoidance that
34. See, e.g., Richard Thaler & Eric Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying
to Break Even: The Effects of PriorOutcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 657 (1990)

(discussing the "house money" effect, in which gamblers exhibit a greater tendency to take risks
with prior gambling winnings, presumably because gamblers can mentally "code" the later
losses in a manner that integrates them with the prior gains); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
33, at 310-11.
35. H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN ANTHROPOLOGY: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 256-88 (1995); FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH
METHODS 99-123 (1984).

36. E.g., Donna Bobek & Richard C. Hatfield, The Effect of Policy Objectives,
Complexity, and Self-Interest on Individuals' ComparativeFairnessJudgments of a Flat Tax,

13 ADVANCES INTAX'N 1 (2001); Cares & Cuccia, supra note 10; Valerie C. Milliron et al.,
Policy Judgments of Taxpayers: An Analysis of CriteriaEmployed, 2 ADVANCES IN TAX'N 201

(1989).
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exceed the financial cost of the tax.37 In the experimental "ultimatum
game," for example, one player proposes a division of a sum of
money to a second player, who may either accept or reject the
division. 38 If the second player rejects the proposal, both players
receive nothing; if the second player accepts the proposal, the parties
both receive the proposed division amounts.39 Numerous studies
show that the responding players "typically reject offers of less than
20 percent of the total amount available," establishing that players are
"willing to punish unfair behavior, even at a financial cost to
themselves. 4 °
We can find even closer parallels to taxpayer behavior in studies
involving the "power-to-take" game. 4 1 Before the game begins, each
participant earns income by performing a task on a computer.42
Experimenters then randomly assign participants to one of two roles,
a "take authority" or a "responder," and randomly pair them up with
37. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation. The Economics of
Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 161-62 (describing and collecting cites to
studies of the ultimatum game in a number of countries); see also Joseph Henrich et al., In
Search of Homo Economicus: BehavioralExperiments in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 73 (2001) (describing the same); Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargainingand Market
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 1068 (1991) (describing the same).
38. Christine Jolls
et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 21-23 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Similarly, the proposers in
ultimatum games frequently make initial allocations that reflect concerns for fair-dealing, rather
than self-interested maximization of their own shares. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Behavioral
Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, 36 ECON.
INQUIRY 335, 340-44 (1998) (discussing various ultimatum game experiments that show initial
allocation offers frequently range between twenty percent and fifty percent). Unlike ultimatum
games, a subject in a "dictator game" is assigned the role of proposer and is not confronted with
a recipient who can decide whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation. The frequency of
initial allocation offers reflecting self-interested maximization on the part of the proposer
increases in such games over that seen in ultimatum games. However, offered allocations
showing concerns for fair-dealing and reciprocity are not entirely eliminated, even when the
proposer knows nothing about the putative recipient of the dictated allocation. E.g., Elizabeth
Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 653 (1996).

39. Jolls et al., supra note 38, at 21-22.
40. Id. at 22.
41. See Bosman & van Winden, supra note 1, at 147-49 (describing the power-to-take
game, and the potential of the game to model taxation issues).
42. Id. at 148; see id at 151 & n.8 (describing the computer task, which took thirty
minutes, and subjects' perceptions of the task as "work").
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each other.43 The player designated as the take authority chooses a
"take rate," which is the proportion of the responder's income she
wishes to appropriate. 44 The responder can choose to destroy all or
45
any part of her own income before having the take rate applied to it.
Destroying income involves real costs for the responder, but it also
reduces the amount that the take authority receives. 46 Therefore, the
game offers an ideal vehicle for investigating "how subjects trade off
emotional satisfaction of punishment against monetary gain, '4 7 an
investigation that could shed much light on the dynamics of tax
aversion.
Also of potential relevance is the growing body of empirical work
using experimental games to model the provision of public goods.48
These experiments attempt to identify the conditions that lead people
to voluntarily contribute to public goods, and, conversely, the
conditions that make it more likely that people will fail to contribute.
A study of the success or failure of collective action in uncoerced
settings might lead to an understanding about the degree to which the
legal mechanism of compulsory collection coordinates and facilitates
the kinds of cooperative endeavors in which people would voluntarily
engage absent coercion, and the degree to which compulsory
43.

Id.at 151.

44. Id. at 148.
45. Id. Unlike the binary choice presented by the ultimatum game, the power-to-take
game permits the responder to choose exactly how much (if any) of her own income to destroy.
Id. at 148 n.2. Interestingly, however, most responders in the Bosman and van Winden study
chose one of two extreme reactions, either destroying all of their income or none of it. See id. at
153-54 & tbl. 1 (discussing this finding). For example, half of the eight responders presented
with take rates of seventy-five percent or higher opted for total destruction, and one additional
respondent chose ninety-nine percent destruction; the other three responders engaged in no
destruction at all. Id. at 153 tbl. 1. No destruction of income occurred in this experiment at take
rates of less than seventy percent. Id.
46. Id. at 148.
47. Id. Responders' self-reports suggest the presence of negative emotions, including
"irritation, contempt, anger, and envy," both among those who destroyed income and those who
did not. Id. at 153. However, the strength of these negative emotions varied positively with the
take rate, and the intensity of negative emotions and the take rate were both positively

correlated with the destruction of income. Id. at 154-56 & tbls. 2, 3, 4.
48. For a concise and useful introduction to the literature on public goods experiments,
see Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation,J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1998, at 187; see also Christina M. Fong et al., Behavioral Foundations of Egalitarianism,
Reciprocity and Altruism 9-11 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.umass.edu/preferen/
gintis/bfghand.pdf (discussing experimental literature on n-player public goods games).
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collection instead forces contributions that would not otherwise be
the larger the degree of tax
made. 49 The larger the latter component,
5

aversion we would expect to see.

0

II. LEARNING FROM PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

A large body of experimental work conducted in controlled
laboratory settings analyzes how people react to small-group games
involving contributions to a public good. 51 Contrary to predictions
that might flow from a simple rational actor model of human
behavior, significant levels of voluntary contributions have been
found in numerous public goods games and other experimental
interactions conducted in various times and places. 52 We believe that
49. An analogous contrast might be drawn between two traffic laws--one that dictates the
side of the road on which people should drive, and another that limits speed on a wide, straight,
uncongested thoroughfare to 40 miles per hour. The first law coordinates the sort of cooperative
action in which people would engage anyway, while the second law most likely coerces
behavior in which people would not otherwise engage.
50. It is not quite as simple as that, however, because compulsion fundamentally changes
the picture. On the one hand, some people who are willing to contribute voluntarily under a
given set of circumstances may resent a compulsory collection under the same set of
circumstances if part of what made the contribution attractive in the first case was its voluntary
nature. Cf Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274,
298-99 (1966) (presenting experimental results indicating that appeals to subjects' consciences
are more successful in increasing tax compliance than increased threats of sanctions). On the
other hand, adding elements of compulsion directed at thwarting free riders can elicit higher
levels of voluntary contributions. In the latter case, the compulsion might be seen as a proxy for
a social contract or other voluntary arrangement in which the group's members derive benefits
from binding themselves to undertake certain obligations. See John T. Scholz, Carrots or Just
Deserts: Adding Assurance to Deterrence Models 7-10 (2002) (on file with author) (discussing
a contractual model of tax collection). There are also many differences between the
experimental setting and the real-world tax context that complicate matters; for an exploration
of these complications, see Part III, infra.
51. A pure public good, in the economic sense, exhibits two features: non-rival
consumption and non-excludable consumption. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 56 (setting
forth these criteria). Few or no real-world goods fit this definition in the strict sense, but many
goods do exhibit these features to some degree, or over some range. See, e.g., RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 (1982) (observing that "one can easily list goods that seem
similar to public goods over some range of the number of consumers"). The goods that are at
issue in the experiments we describe might instead be termed collective goods or group goods.
See id. (expressing a preference for this terminology when a good does not fit the criteria of a
pure public good). However, because the term "public goods" is typically used in the
experiments themselves, we will retain that terminology here.
52. For example, Fehr and Gachter, supra note 37, summarize a variety of laboratory and
survey studies showing that individual participants from contemporary, Western societies
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the conditions eliciting voluntary contributions might be the same as
the conditions in which compulsory tax collection becomes more
acceptable. Similarly, the circumstances in which people resist
making voluntary contributions to public goods are the same
circumstances in which compulsory collections would be resented.
One common experimental game is set up so that contributions to
the group are multiplied by some factor and then redistributed to the
group's members in equal shares. 53 For example, a group of seven
people might each begin with $5.00, which the members may either
keep or contribute to the group; contributions are then multiplied by a
factor of three and redistributed to the group on a per capita basis. If
group members cannot make binding agreements with other
members, a single player will always do best by not contributing,
regardless of what everyone else does. If a representative player, Aja,
does not contribute but everyone else in the group does, then Aja's
payoff equals her $5.00 "non-contribution" plus her share of the pot
($12.86), 54 for a total of $17.86. If Aja contributes along with the rest
of the group, she receives only $15, one-seventh of a somewhat large
pot ($105).f On the other hand, if nobody contributes, including Aja,
she keeps her $5.00, and if only Aja contributes, she receives only
1/7 of the $15.00 pot, or $2.14. At all points in between these
extreme cases, the same logic holds true; Aja always does best by not
contributing, no matter what the other players do.
This "multiplier" public goods game represents a garden-variety
multi-party prisoner's dilemma.56 Figure 2 illustrates the basic payoff
(ranging from forty to sixty-six percent of the subjects) often employed principles of reciprocity
in posited exchanges, while a smaller percentage (twenty to thirty percent of the subjects)
employed measures of self-interest. Id. at 162; see Hoffman et al., Behavioral Foundationsof
Reciprocity, supra note 38, at 340-41 (discussing typical outcomes in ultimatum and dictator
games); Roth et al., supra note 37, at 1091-94 (discussing similar outcomes in bargaining
games in cross-cultural settings).
53.

See, e.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 48, at 188 (describing the typical public good

game with multiplier).
54. This figure results from first multiplying the S5 contributions of the other 6 players by
the multiplier factor of 3, which yields a pot of $90. We then equally divide that pot among the
7 players ($90/7 = $12.86).
55. 7 X $5.00X 3 =$105
56. See Amnon Rapoport, Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental
Paradigm,79 AM. POL. SC. REV. 148, 148-49 (1985) (observing that "[i]f the benefit to the

group increases as the number of contributors grows, with no minimal contributing set (MCS),
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structure; the payoff line for "contribute" always lies below the
payoff line for "don't contribute."57 The dotted horizontal line
represents the starting sum each player receives ($5.00 in the
example above).
Figure 2
Payoffs for One Player in a "Multiplier"
Public Good Contribution Game

Number of Other Contributors

Not all public goods games involve a multiplying pot of money
where each contribution yields the same marginal benefit to the
group. Other public goods experiments provide a single lump-sum
bonus to the group if enough group members contribute.5 8 This
represents a "step-level" good 59 that is best conceptualized by
the provision of public goods may be modeled as an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game in
which the (pure) strategy not to contribute is unconditionally best"); HARDIN, supra note 51, at
25-28 (demonstrating that provision of a collective good presents a strategic dilemma that is
logically identical to the Prisoner's Dilemma); see also Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an
Agreeable N-Prisoners' Dilemma, 16 BEHAV. SCI. 472 (1971) (providing a more extensive
analysis of the same point).
57.

See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 27-28 & fig.I.3 (1989) (analyzing and

depicting a structurally identical dilemma, using a graph type introduced by Thomas Schelling).
58. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing components and design of a steplevel public good game).
59. Step-level goods are public goods for which some minimum threshold of
contributions must be obtained in order for the good to be provided at all, and additional
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considering a real-world analogy: a bridge. 60 A partial bridge is
useless, and a bridge that spans more than the necessary space
provides no additional benefits. Thus, contributions short of the
threshold necessary to provide an entire bridge are of no use, and
contributions in excess of that threshold are superfluous. Imagine that
a bridge will cost $10,000 to construct, and that we have ten players
who will all benefit equally from the bridge. Each player will receive
a benefit of $2,000 if the bridge is built, making the project clearly
worthwhile. Further imagine that a machine costlessly transforms
players' contributions into bridge construction. The players have no
opportunity for communication or side-deals, and each player
contributes confidentially, so no player can impose even informal
sanctions on noncontributors.6 1
Will the bridge be build? It might seem there is little reason for
optimism. First, each player knows that if she contributes while
enough others fail to do so, she will lose her money (the bridgebuilding machine transforms the contribution into a useless partial
bridge). In addition, each player knows that it would be "worth it" for
the others to provide the bridge even without her participation, and
this creates a powerful incentive to free ride. These two hindrances to
cooperation can be labeled "fear" and "greed," respectively. 62 Each
contributions made above that threshold do not increase or improve the good. See, e.g., Ido
Erev & Amon Rapoport, Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution
Mechanism, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 401, 403 (1990) (discussing "public or collective
goods that only exist after a substantial amount has been contributed to their production, and
then do not increase in quality or quantity if more contributions are made").
60. Note that a bridge is not a pure public good in the economic sense. See supra note 51
(defining public goods). While a bridge is nonrival within a certain range (until crowding
inhibits the use of the bridge), the use of tolls can easily provide exclusivity.
61. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groupsfor Collective Action, 80 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1171, 1175 (1986) (describing a "standard step-level public goods game" as "one that
involves no communication, no opportunity for persuasion or coercion, no possibility of side
payments or reciprocity, and no social disclosure of individual choices (except to the
experimenters)").
62. Id. at 1173-74 (citing Clyde Coombs, A Reparameterization of the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, 18 BEHAV. SCI. 424, 424-28 (1973), which discusses the competing motives of
fear and greed in the context of a prisoner's dilemma). The use of the term "fear" by Dawes and
his coauthors to refer to a futile contribution constitutes only one of several possible uses of that
term in the context of experimental games. It might also be used to refer to a fear of retaliation
in a repeat-play game, as in Coombs, supra,at 426, or to the fear of being "suckered" by others.
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing varying uses of these terms).
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individual faces three possible outcomes: her contribution will be
futile (despite the contribution, there are insufficient funds to provide
the bridge), critical (the contribution makes the difference in the
completion of the bridge), or redundant (the bridge would have been
built even without the contribution).63 Only in the case where the
individual's contribution64 is critical would a rational actor find
contributing worthwhile.
If we simplify the choice situation to one in which our
representative player, Aja, decides whether or not to contribute her
"share" ($1,000) to the bridge project, the payoffs depicted in Table 1
frame the choice:
Table 1
Net Payoffs in a Step-Level Public Goods Game

Contribute
Don't
Contt

1Contribute

Futile

Critical

Redundant

- S1,000

$1,000

$1,000

0

0

$2,000

If Aja contributes futilely, she loses $1,000 with no countervailing
benefits. If Aja contributes nothing where her contribution would
have been futile, she receives a net payout of zero (she loses nothing,
and gains nothing). If Aja makes a critical contribution, she receives
a benefit of $2,000 at a cost of $1,000, yielding a net gain of $1,000.
If she contributes nothing when her contribution would have been
critical, she again pays nothing and receives nothing. Finally, if her
contribution will be redundant, making it yields her a net payoff of
$1000 ($2,000-$1,000); choosing not to contribute in this event
produces benefits of $2,000 at zero cost.
63. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178 (applying this analysis to a step-level good);
see also Rapoport, supra note 56, at 149-50 (presenting formal analysis corresponding to this
framework, and discussing similar models applied to voting behavior).
64. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178.
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Thus, we would expect Aja to contribute when she anticipates that
her contribution will be critical, but not when she expects it to be
either futile or redundant. A rational Aja would base her course of
action on estimates of the respective probabilities of each of these
three states of the world.6 5 Only when the probability that she will
make a critical contribution exceeds fifty percent will Aja find it
worthwhile to contribute her fair share, based on these monetary
payoffs. 66 Thus, voluntary contributions to step-level public goods
are only rational when players determine that the chance of making a
critical contribution is sufficiently high, and irrational otherwise.6 7
Because the odds are vanishingly small that one's own
contribution will be "critical" in public finance settings, the step-good
65. For example, if Aja judges the three possibilities (futile, critical, and redundant) as
equally likely, she will make a decision based on the expected values generated by those
probabilities as follows:
Contribute = (-$1,000 X .33) + ($1,000 X .33) + ($1,000 X .33) = $333
Don't Contribute = (0 X .33) + (0 X .33) + ($2,000 X .33) = $666
Under these assumptions, the choice not to contribute dominates.
66. The following equations, which assume a 52% probability of a critical contribution
and probabilities of 24% for each of the other two possibilities, illustrate:
Contribute = (-$1,000 X .24) + ($1,000 X .52) + ($1,000 X .24) = $520
Don't Contribute = (0 X .24) + (0 X .52) + ($2,000 X .24) = $480
Here, the "contribute" option dominates. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178 (noting that if
the chance of a critical contribution exceeds 0.50, a participant will expect a net gain from
contributing).
67. Robyn Dawes and his colleagues tested this hypothesis by asking subjects
participating in a step-level public good experiment to estimate the respective chances that their
contribution would be futile, critical, and redundant. Id. at 1178-79 (describing theoretical
framework and methodology). The results were interesting, in part because the contribution
level in the standard game accompanied by the probability estimates-a mere 23% -was
significantly lower than in two experiments run a few years earlier by the authors. Compare id.
at 1180 tbl.3 (showing contribution rates of 23% in the standard dilemma involving probability
estimates) with id. at 1176-77 tbls. 1-2 (presenting results of two previous standard public goods
experiments with contribution levels of 51% and 64%, respectively). While the authors
cautioned against "too easy" speculation about the causes of these differences, id. at 1180, we
cannot resist one vein of speculation: Could making people estimate these probabilities cause
them to approach the choice in a more calculating frame of mind, such that they become more
"rationally uncooperative"? While the cooperators contributed despite an average subjective
chance of making a critical contribution of 0.29 (far below the 0.50 mark above which
contributions become rational), the many defectors, on average, judged the chance of a critical
contribution to be even less likely (0.18). Id. at 1180-81 & tbl. 4.
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analysis might seem to have little traction for tax policy. 68 Yet more
than the rationality calculation suggested here underlies contribution
decisions. Contributions occur at significant levels even where the
public good involved is not of the "step" variety (that is, where the
"don't contribute" option should always dominate), and also occur
with step-level goods even where subjective estimates of the chance
of making a critical contribution are too low to rationally justify
making the contribution. 69 Experiments involving step-level goods
help in pinpointing motivations, and thus help us discover the
additional factors potentially involved in contribution decisions for
public goods of all sorts.
Dawes and his co-authors used a step-level game to determine the
relative importance of fear (of losing one's contribution to a public
good without receiving the public good) and greed (the opportunity to
free ride) in jeopardizing the provision of public goods. 70 After
conducting a standard public goods game to establish a baseline for
cooperation, 7 1 the Dawes study controls for fear of a futile
contribution by offering a money-back guarantee.72 To put this in
terms of our bridge-building machine, rather than construct a partial
bridge with the contributions, the machine detects the insufficiency of
funds and returns all contributions to the contributors. Next, Dawes
and his co-authors attempted to control for greed by adding an
"enforced contribution" requirement, providing that if players raise
68. In contrast, in small-group settings each group member can verbally pre-commit to
providing no more than her fair share, dramatically increasing the odds that each individual will
perceive her own contribution to be critical to the enterprise.
69. See supra notes 52, 66-67 and accompanying text.
70. The authors presented the results of three different experiments, each with three parts:
a standard public goods game, a game involving a "money-back" guarantee, and a game
involving an "enforced contribution" condition. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1176-79.
The third experiment also involved subjects' subjective estimates of the probability that their
contribution would be futile, critical, or redundant. Id. at 1178-79; see supra note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing this experiment).
71. The game involved the provision of a step-level public good by a seven-member
group. The experimenter gave every player a $5 promissory note, which she could either keep
or contribute. The group would receive a bonus of $70 to divide among its members if enough
players contributed. The first experiment required three contributors, while the second and third
experiments required five contributors. Id. at 1176-77, 1179.
72. Id. at 1175; see also id. at 1172 (providing a real-world example in which a group of
state system faculty members used such a technique to raise money for a lobbyist); ELSTER,
supra note 57, at 42 (discussing this "money-back" technique).
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sufficient funds to produce the public good, the game forces everyone
in the group to contribute their share.73 This eliminates the possibility
of free riding.
Interestingly, the Dawes study found that the enforced
contribution condition produced significantly higher voluntary
contribution levels, while the money-back guarantee failed to
produce statistically significant changes in contribution levels.74 The
authors conclude that "greed," not "fear," causes cooperation to fail.75
In other words, the authors' analysis suggests that people who switch
from being noncontributors in the basic game to being contributors in
the enforced contribution game are would-be free riders who no
longer have an
incentive to free ride under the enforced contribution
76
requirement.

This analysis, like the expected value calculations discussed
above, assumes that participants are indifferent to the payoffs of other
people and wish only to maximize their own payoffs. Yet, people
often seem to care about others' payoffs. Expanding the model to
take account of a more complex vision of human rationality yields a
plausible alternative explanation for the results observed in the
Dawes study. Importantly, this alternative explanation shows how we
can reconcile those results with the relatively high baseline
73. Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175. In fact, the "enforced contribution" game was
framed slightly differently, which might have impacted the results. The players all began with
$5 and had the choice of whether to contribute. If there were enough contributions, each of the
seven players would receive their $10 share of the bonus, but no player was allowed to receive
more than $10. This cap effectively forced a contribution from each player. See id.
74. In one experiment, the enforced-contribution variation yielded contribution rates of
86%, as compared with 51% in the standard dilemma setting. In a second experiment, the
contribution rate in the enforced-contribution setting reached 93%, as compared with 64% in
the standard dilemma context. Id. at 1176-78 & tbls. 1-2. In the third experiment, which required
subjects to make probability estimates, the contribution rate in the enforced-contribution setting
was 77%, compared with a 23% contribution rate in the standard dilemma. Id. at 1180 tbl.3.
The contribution levels for the money-back guarantee condition were 61%, 65%, and 43%,
respectively. See id. at 1176-80 & tbls. 1-3 (presenting and discussing these results).
75. See id. at 1183 (positing, based on experimental results, that "[flear of loss through
contributing is not the critical motivation underlying defection"; rather, "the relative success of
the enforced contribution is consistent with the hypothesis that desire for gain through defecting
is the motivation underlying defection").
76. See id. (hypothesizing that "enforcing a contribution if a public good is provided
works to promote contribution by convincing people that the good will be provided and by
removing the opportunity for free riding if it is provided").

20031

Fear and Greed in Tax Policy

contribution levels seen in many public goods games.
Imagine that Aja is a fair-minded individual who wants to
contribute to the public good. However, she suffers severe disutility if
other people can free ride on her contributions. In other words, Aja is
perfectly happy to accept the $1,000 net "contributor's benefit" in the
bridge example; indeed, this squares perfectly with her sense of
equity. However, the thought that someone else could receive the
$2,000 "free rider's benefit" irks her to no end; she does not want
someone to make her a "sucker., 77 Thus, Aja will most likely
contribute in the "enforced contribution" situation. She contributes
not because the "free rider's benefit" is now unavailable to her, but
because the free rider's benefit is unavailable to others. The rules of
enforced contribution require anyone who ends up benefiting from
the contributions to pay their fair share.
Under this interpretation, the potential pressures against
contribution to a public good include not only fear and greed, but also
"fear of greed"--the fear that greedy individuals will receive benefits
without paying for them. This interpretation fits well with the
experimental results in many public goods games. Some individuals
begin cooperating, but cooperation decays over time.78 One
interpretation that scholars have discredited through experimentation
is that people learn to defect-that they learn how the game really
works and come to appreciate the benefits of free riding. 79 Another
77. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu,More Order Without More Law: A Theory
of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 403 (1994)

("Human beings possess a very strong emotional desire not to be suckered"). Somewhat
confusingly, the Dawes study also uses the word "suckered," but to describe the very different

situation in which a player makes a futile contribution. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175
(observing that "subjects could still lose their contributions and be 'suckered' if enough other
people did not contribute and the good was not provided). We think a critical component to the
.feeling of being "suckered" is the knowledge or belief that someone else benefits unfairly from
one's own contributions. This is consistent with the use of the term "sucker" in Prisoner's
Dilemma games. E.g., ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE
PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM 63-64 (1989) (applying "free rider" and "sucker" designations to the
Prisoner's Dilemma); Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 133, 141-42 & fig.8.1 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing

"sucker's payoff' in conjunction with a prisoner's dilemma matrix).
78. See, e.g., Fong et al., supra note 48, at 9-10.
79. See, e.g., id. at 10 (discussing research that suggests this explanation is invalid); see
also Fehr & Gachter, supra note 37, at 164-65; URs FISCHBACHER ET AL., ARE PEOPLE
CONDITIONALLY COOPERATIVE? EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT 9 (Univ. of
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explanation has gained support: That people who start out
cooperating stop in reaction to the non-cooperation of other group
members.8 0 Often, the game structure permits no communication of
one's displeasure toward a defecting player other than defecting
oneself.8 1 When devices to communicate through sanctions exist,
group members use those devices instead of defecting. 2
Knowing whether greed or fear of greed acts as the dominant
factor in unraveling cooperative action in these settings could provide
useful insight in formulating a policy response to the collective action
problem. If greed dominates, the individual player will act based on
her perceptions of her own payoffs, including the sanctions that the
other players can bring to bear against her in the event she attempts to
free ride. If fear of greed dominates, the individual's perception of
the sanctions that she and others can bring to bear against other free
riders determines her willingness to cooperate.8 3
III. REAL-WORLD COMPLICATIONS IN TAX-FUNDED BENEFITS
The public goods examples presented above, like much of the
experimental literature within the public goods genre, seem to offer
useful lessons for tax policy. These examples suggest that
enforcement can play a facilitating role in eliciting cooperation to the
extent it removes the temptation to free ride and the fear that others
will succumb to that temptation.84 Applied to the taxation arena, it
appears that people's contributions are more a product of cooperation
Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 16, 2000),
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/delivery.cfm/000106400.pdf? abstractid=203288.
80. Fehr & Gichter, supra note 37, at 162-63, 165 (observing that participants in repeatplay experiments often employed principles of reciprocity to discipline self-interested
participants to adopt more reciprocal responses in successive exchanges).
81. See, e.g., id. at 161-62; see also James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public Goods
Experiments: Kindness or Confusion, 85 Am. ECON. REV. 891, 900 (1995) (concluding that
thwarted attempts at kindness and cooperative behavior likely lead to the decay of cooperation
in repeat-play games).
82. See, e.g., FALK et al., supra note 7, at 31-32.
83. This might seem to be a distinction without a difference, insofar as tougher
enforcement would answer both concerns. Yet it may lead to subtly different rhetorical and
policy strategies when employed in a real-world context involving heterogeneous actors.
84. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1183-84 (observing that "[e]nforcing contribution
should a public good be provided is, by this hypothesis, an institutional modification that is
appropriately attuned to widespread, perhaps characteristic, human motivations").
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and less a product of compulsion in settings where people see that
others who enjoy the public goods must make similar contributions.
On this view, the compulsory nature of taxes should go far towards
overcoming the resistance to contributing to public goods by
addressing fears of free riding that can otherwise unravel public
goods games. Indeed, free-rider concerns are often used to justify
government provision of public goods.85
However, we must proceed with caution in applying insights from
stylized games involving small numbers of participants in
experimental settings to any culturally-situated arena. The prevalence
of the free riding concerns discussed above might increase or
decrease in a given real-world tableau. In this Part, we discuss certain
features of the federal income tax system that one might expect to
heighten or complicate concerns about free riding, notwithstanding
the existence of a compulsory collection system that in some measure
replicates the "enforced contribution" condition. Additional studies
that incorporate these features might refine our understanding of tax
aversion.
A. DisagreementAbout Ends
The public goods typically at issue in experimental settings
transparently benefit the players. Indeed, the public good in question
is usually a cash bonus distributed among the players on a per capita
basis.86 Where benefits are uncontroversially valuable, tangible, and
easy to measure, players confront a stark conflict between collective
and personal benefit maximization. When an individual fails to
contribute in that context, she cannot claim that she thinks the public
good in question is not worth providing-her noncontribution can
only be interpreted as free riding.
In contrast, people often have differing opinions about the value
85. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 64 ("Some suggest that the free rider problem
necessarily leads to inefficient levels of public goods; therefore, efficiency requires government
provision of such goods").
86.

Cf Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q. J.

ECON. 745, 752 (1990) (observing that "harmony" in individual voters' interests "is relatively
easy to achieve in projects that provide only pecuniary benefits, but harder to achieve when
projects also provide their owners direct consumption").
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of real-world public goods. Hence, noncontributors may not be
expressing a greedy desire to free ride, nor even a fear that others will
do so, but rather a genuine disinterest in the provided good. Of
course, it is often difficult to determine noncontributors' true
motivations. Free riders often employ a stratagem of falsely
announcing that they87 do not value a public good, in the hopes that
others will pay for it.

Some contexts make testing the truthfulness of participants'
representations about their preferences easier than others. To return to
the bridge example, we could announce that only contributors of a set
amount (for example, the $1,000 fair share) will receive passes that
will allow them to use the bridge if completed.8 8 Unlike the enforced
contribution condition, this system ensures that no person will have
to contribute if she actually attaches a lower value to the good than
the enforced contribution amount. However, this solution is
unworkable where exclusion from a good is difficult.
The enforced contribution version of the public goods game does
not permit as fine-grained a customization of a good's provision and
funding as would the system just described, but it does provide an
interesting proxy mechanism for assessing the popularity of the
public good. In the first phase of the enforced contribution public
goods game, the voluntary contributions amount to a monetary "vote"
for the provision of the public good. If the vote carries, then everyone
who benefits must contribute. Our political system does not offer a
direct monetary vote through which a government body can
aggregate preferences in a manner that accounts for their intensity.8 9
87. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 63 (explaining that "people may have incentives to
hide their true preferences for a public good"). While economic analysis often assumes that
people will hide their true preferences in order to free ride, the extent to which people actually
engage in such self-serving behavior is empirically questionable. See Earl R. Brubaker, Free
Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J. L. & ECON. 147 (1975)

(questioning this

assumption and discussing research findings in which expressed demand for a collective good
did not appear to suffer from severe free ridership distortions).
88. This could be coupled with a money-back guarantee in the event the bridge is not
built.
89. See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111,

113-16 (2000)

(discussing conventional explanations for prohibition of vote buying and selling). Of course,
those with intense, money-backed preferences can attempt to exert indirect influence on
political outcomes. See, e.g., id. at 129 (discussing "indirect vote buying," which includes
individual contributions to campaigns and to organizations backing particular candidates and
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Moreover, people typically vote for representatives rather than on
issues in isolation.90 This blunts people's ability to signal preferences
about specific public goods.
In contexts where the public good in question is unambiguously
more valuable than the contributions participants are called upon to
make, a compulsory collective mechanism adds value by solving a
collective action problem. But when we recognize the possibility that
people might genuinely disagree about whether and to what extent
particular goods generate benefits, the compulsory nature of the
collection mechanism takes on a different cast. 9 1 Compulsory
collections from those who genuinely attach a lower value to the
provided good than to the amount of their enforced contributions are
not coordinating unambiguously valuable action; rather they are
coercing people to make contributions that are of negative value to
them. 92 Taxpayers might view compulsion as presumptively
undesirable and justifiable only when accompanied by a
countervailing benefit-when the compulsion delivers to each
causes); Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is the Timing of
ContributionsEverything?, 41 J. L. & ECON. 85 (1998) (presenting empirical work addressing
the extent to which Political Action Committees make contributions that are designed to
influence congressional votes on particular issues).
90. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESING COMPLEXITY 128
(2000) (observing that "voters are not able to pick and choose among the features they like in
the incumbent and a challenger").
91. See Brubaker, supra note 87, at 156 (explaining that a compulsory collection system
overcomes the problem of "free riding" only by introducing the possibility of "forced-riding"enforced collections from those who do not, in fact, value the good to the extent of the
collection).
92. In local taxation contexts, people with similar tastes in public goods might efficiently
cluster together, eliminating some of these concerns. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL
SYSTEMS 299 (1969) (positing that "it is efficient for people with similar tastes in social goods
to reside together"). The Tiebout hypothesis is premised on precisely such clustering. See
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956)
(explaining that consumers make choices among communities just as they make choices among
goods in private markets, so that "[s]patial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart
to the private market's shopping trip"). However, this clustering can lead to a larger-scale free
rider problem among local municipalities where people are heterogeneous not only with regard
to tastes but also with regard to resources. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 730-33 (N.J. 1975) (recognizing temptation for a
growing municipality to seek only that form of growth that will enhance its tax base by
excluding the poor, to the detriment of the surrounding region); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule,
112 YALE L.J. 617, 652-54 (2002) (book review) (discussing municipal incentives to shift the
costs of poverty to other jurisdictions).
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individual a state of the world that she values more highly than the
state of the world without such contributions or provided goods. If
many public goods are provided, some of which generate a surplus
for the taxpayer and some of which generate a deficit, this criterion
would be satisfied as long as the net result is positive for a given
taxpayer. Nevertheless, we should keep this concern in mind to the
extent that it becomes empirically plausible to suppose that certain
categories of taxpayers have their interests consistently overridden.
B. Factoringin IntentionalRedistribution
Public goods games are interesting because they involve the risk
of cross-subsidization of some players by other players. In this sense,
the prospect of unintentional redistribution always looms in the
background. However, public goods games typically do not involve
an intentional or structured effort to benefit certain players at the
expense of others. Nor do these experiments involve players who
command different resources within the context of the game. In
contrast, a real society includes people who are heterogeneous with
regard to resources. Moreover,
a good deal of taxation effects
93
redistribution by design.
We can analytically recast redistribution as a public good. 94 The
new distribution pattern itself might be seen as a public good, 95 or it
can generate collateral public goods by providing a minimal level of
subsistence to the citizenry, thereby creating a society in which
children receive adequate nutrition and in which people do not
languish in impoverishment. 96 However, problems remain.
First, deep political and philosophical differences exist about
93. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 76 (describing the role that taxation
plays "in determining how the social product is shared out among different individuals" as one
of its "two primary functions"); Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAx L. REV.
419, 438 (1996) (listing redistribution as a principal goal of taxation).
94. Wil Arts & Peter van Wijck, Share and Share Alike? Social Constraintson Income
Equalization, 3 SOC. JUST. RES. 233, 235 (1989) (characterizing income distribution as a public
good).
95. Id
96. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependenceand Choice in DistributiveJustice: The
Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 235, 267-74 (1994) (discussing costs to non-poor
associated with poverty).
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whether redistribution is, or could be said to generate, a public good.
Second, those who benefit directly and monetarily from redistribution
receive, by definition, a higher level of benefits than those who
receive just the ambient public good associated with the
redistribution (the monetary beneficiaries receive both the ambient
good and a check). Also, the recipients of the redistribution will not
make positive net contributions to that redistribution.9 7 Finally, free
riding can operate because at least some potential "net recipients"
control some of the factors that could place them in a position to be a
"net recipient" in a particular round of play.
An example illustrates some dimensions of the problem. Imagine
ten individuals are about to embark on a group expedition through a
wilderness area in winter, a joint enterprise in which the well-being
of all the group members will matter. Before beginning, it becomes
apparent that two of the ten participants lack a warm winter hat, an
essential piece of survival equipment. A hat store nearby offers new
expedition-warmth hats for $20.00 each, but the hatless participants
have no money. Equipping both of the hatless group members
requires $40.00 in contributions from the group, or $5.00 from each
of the eight moneyed members of the group.
Supplying hats to the hatless accomplishes two things. First, it
effects a tangible redistribution from the hatted to the hatless; each
hatless person gains a $20.00 value, while each hatted person must
contribute $5.00. Second, it generates a suitably-dressed expedition
cohort (a valuable public good) for the group. Even if this is not
deemed valuable in itself, a number of valuable collateral goods may
flow from the redistribution: that the group does not have to see any
of its members perish from hypothermia en route, that pity does not
move a member of the group to give up essential clothing in the
middle of the expedition, that a desperately cold, hatless person does
not assault another group member to obtain a hat, or that the
expedition is not interrupted by the need to call for (and potentially
finance) emergency medical assistance.
Of course, the hatless individuals who receive the direct benefits
97. Of course, the possibility exists that they might literally make contributions. However,
in order for redistribution to occur, they will always receive all these contributions back, plus a
surplus, making their net contribution to the good negative.
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from the hats also benefit from the public good of a well-dressed
expedition cohort; the other group members receive only the ambient
public good. Where redistribution is the point of a collective
contribution arrangement, participants on the receiving end of the
redistribution will always receive larger net benefits than the
participants who subsidize them. This means that some of the
participants necessarily occupy the position of full or partial free
riders, at least within a given round of the game. Because the term
"free rider" usually carries the connotation of strategic exploitation,
we dub those recipients who free ride out of necessity "needy riders."
An enforced contribution scheme like that outlined by Dawes and
his co-authors cannot address needy riding; it defeats the purpose of
redistribution to force the recipients to pay their fair share for the
benefits received. Yet if each individual at least partially controls the
factors that determine whether she meets the criteria for receiving
redistribution, making structural provision for needy riding
encounters problems. Not only might the prospect of a free ride tempt
some group members to put themselves into a position that makes
them eligible for redistributive benefits, but it might also cause other
members of the group to fear potential free riding (masquerading as
needy riding) on the part of others, a prospect to which they may
react by refusing to contribute.
Thus, the redistributive element adds a new concern about free
riding recipients (faux needy riding) without ameliorating the original
concern about free riding among contributors that is endemic to the
provision of even non-redistributive public goods. To put this in
terms of our expedition example, a given would-be contributor must
concern herself not only with strategic hatlessness, but also with the
possibility that other hatted people will choose not to contribute so as
to gain the ambient benefits of a well-dressed expedition cohort at the
expense of the other hatted people. There are now two independent
ways in which cooperation might unravel, because there are two
avenues for potential free riding and two ways to become a "sucker."
A certain destructive synergy may result. For example, imagine
two would-be contributors, Cody and Chako. Cody believes that the
hatless people are really strategic free riders in disguise and refuses to
contribute. Chako interprets this refusal as a greedy desire on the part
of Cody to free ride on the poverty relief efforts of the other group
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members, and Chako therefore retaliates by refusing to contribute.
An enforced contribution requirement could solve this problem, but it
requires adding a means-test to determine whether one is among the
"contribution eligible" or, instead, eligible to receive the benefits of
redistribution. In the hat example, this requires equipment and funds
checks to see who should contribute and who may receive
contributions. Such a test might superficially solve the problem of
free riding among those identified as contributors, but it would in turn
heighten concerns about strategic behavior designed to keep one from
being identified as a contributor.
Finding ways to minimize strategic self-qualification for
assistance increases the likelihood of cooperation from all able
contributors.9 8 Society can, for example, choose conditions for
redistribution that fall clearly outside the control of the recipients.
The concern that would-be contributors will attempt to strategically
present themselves as needy riders disappears when we base
redistribution on a characteristic difficult to bring about voluntarily
and very hard to fake, such as old age or permanent disability.
Likewise, need that is the product of events clearly out of the victims'
control, such as a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, avoids such
self-qualification concerns.
Furthermore, certain conditions requiring assistance are not only
outside of individual control, but result from risks spread broadly
across the population. Redistribution in such settings carries the
flavor of insurance; individuals want to provide for people harmed by
forces outside of their control, at least in part because these
individuals could have been (or still might be) in the harmed person's
shoes. However, if a person knows with virtual certainty that she
does not face particular risks, the "self-insurance" function of
98. See Amy Wax, Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of
Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 268 (2000) (arguing that "tolerating
voluntary self-qualification for aid is inconsistent with sustaining a voluntary cooperative
agreement"). In the hat example, self-qualification might be limited by waiting to announce the
redistributive scheme until after the individuals have reported for the expedition. If the
individuals did not have any idea that redistribution would be provided, the possibility of
redistribution could not have an impact on their decisions to show up hatless or without funds.
For obvious reasons, this tactic is not workable for ongoing, society-wide public assistance
schemes.
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redistribution would disappear for her with regard to those risks.
The breadth of an individual's definition of the category of
persons receiving redistributive assistance affects contributors'
perceptions of whether this self-insurance function exists in a given
scenario. If we frame redistribution broadly to help people in a
variety of situations outside of individual control, contributors may
desire the redistribution in a repeat-play setting where they can
contemplate becoming a recipient in a later round or stage of the
interaction. Conversely, if a particular program deals only with a
problem that most members of the population believe they will not
likely face (such as chronic poverty that exists independent of the
usual "good excuses" of old age, disability, or disaster), the selfinsurance justification loses its persuasiveness.
There are several additional features of our 10-person expedition
example that do not exist in a nationwide tax and transfer scheme.
First, the people who benefit from redistribution in the expedition
example are readily identifiable and will continue to be engaged in an
ongoing enterprise with the contributors. This enables the
contributors to see, first-hand, how their donations are being used. In
addition, the benefits themselves are provided in a form (here, hats)
that comports with majoritarian assessments of the recipients' needs.
The scenario does not allow recipients to sell their new warm hats to
purchase, for example, lottery tickets, alcohol, or cigarettes, even if
they might prefer these other consumption alternatives.
Second, the trope of the expedition provides a built-in structure
for potential reciprocity. Those who receive hats from the group
might feel a stronger obligation to the group; they might be more
willing to undertake extraordinary efforts for the group if some
eventuality, such as an accident, made this effort necessary.
Finally, it is clear in this example how the hatlessness of some
members could harm the enterprise as a whole. In the expedition
setting, the fates of all group members are intertwined, making their
utility functions transparently interdependent. In a larger societal
context, many would bridle at the notion that we are all on anything
like an "expedition" together or that a common interest binds us all to
the fates of each other so as to provide a basis for a societal
redistributive scheme. Some would-be contributors would deny
receiving any ambient benefits at all from the redistributive scheme,
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and would profess profound disinterest in the fates of any individuals
other than family members and chosen associates. Such potential
contributors would therefore resent the enforced contribution
condition, despite its capacity to address the problem of free riding
among contributors.
Other would-be contributors might perceive that some ambient
benefits potentially flow from redistribution, but would view other
measures available to them as cheaper means for securing those same
benefits. For example, a potential contributor who believes that
desperate, impoverished people are more likely to commit crime and
less likely to succeed in school might welcome an ambient benefit
arising from redistribution to the poor to lower the crime rate and
make inner city schools better. However, the would-be contributor
might perceive that another option can secure many of the same
safety and educational benefits: insulating herself and her children
from the poor in an exclusive suburb or private community and
sending her children to an exclusive suburban or private school. If
this alternative costs less (including not just the monetary cost, but
also the emotional cost associated with the worry about being
"suckered"), the would-be contributor might resent any requirement
that she contribute to redistribution. Thus, legal features outside the
federal tax and transfer realm are likely to affect the alternatives
available to potential contributors, and these alternatives will in turn
influence the potential contributors' acceptance of redistributive
arrangements.
C. Progressivity
Other structural features of the tax system, such as the degree of
progressivity, may further complicate the array of alternatives and
choices facing participants. Progressivity in contributions is tightly
connected to redistributive concerns, but deserves separate
consideration. First, we should distinguish (i) a progressive tax, in
which those with higher income (or wealth, or other measure of wellbeing) contribute a largerpercentage,99 from (ii) a flat tax, in which
99. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUIA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 50 & n.4 (1996) (defining an income tax as progressive "if
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all contributors pay the same percentage,but those with more income
pay more in absolute terms. We can then readily distinguish both of
these schemes from a per capita "head tax," in which all individuals
pay the same amount, regardless of income.
To justify the move from a head tax to a flat income tax, one
might argue that those with higher income receive a higher level of
benefits from the public goods in question so that their higher
contribution actually represents their "fair share," given the benefits
received. 00 Looking at the bridge example, if we imagine that the
existence of the bridge saves each player thirty minutes in commuting
time each day, the value of that time will differ among individuals. A
high-income attorney with a billing rate of $400 per hour benefits by
$200 each day, while a fast-food worker who earns $10 an hour
benefits by a mere $5 each day.'0° Similar arguments can be made
with greater or lesser degrees of success for other public goods. In
general, wealthier people have more to lose from the breakdown of
social order, and
hence gain more from governmental institutions that
102
preserve order.
Progressivity involves collecting a higher percentage of tax from
those with higher incomes. Even if we accept the argument that a
reasonably tight correspondence exists between the benefits received
through taxation and the tax base (income), then it remains the case
an individual's or family's total tax liability, as a fraction of income, rises with income," and
explaining that the same definition would apply to a tax based on "any alternative measure of
well-being").
100. A related, but distinct, argument would posit that those with higher income or wealth
have, self-evidently, already received disproportionately large amounts of benefits from "the
system" as a whole; otherwise these individuals would not have enjoyed such economic
success. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 17 (observing that we might view "people's
actual levels of welfare, with government in place, as a rough measure of the benefit conveyed
to them by government"). On this account, a progressive tax system amounts, in part, to a
payback for high levels of benefits received elsewhere. This argument is vulnerable to the usual
counter that individual success reflects many factors (e.g., hard work, luck, personal
endowments) for which the state cannot claim credit.
101. Even where high-income individuals receive most of their income through
investments, rather than earnings, these individuals will likely value their time highly. One
might measure this value by the amounts these individuals expend to save time in various ways.
102. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 99, at 53 (explaining that the "benefit principle"
of taxation "suggests that the tax burden should be higher for households with higher income
and wealth, because these people have more to lose from the anarchy that would prevail if the
government withdrew from providing defense, a justice system, police and so on").
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that a fully progressive scheme involves some measure of crosssubsidization from the better-off to the less well-off. We can defend
this subsidization on the ground that the better-off have a greater
ability to pay.10 3 We can augment this assertion by citing the
diminishing marginal utility of money, which makes removal of a
larger percentage off the top of a much larger stack of dollars hurt no
more than taking a smaller percentage off the top of a smaller stack
of dollars. 10 4 To the extent progressivity contributes to distributive
goals, we could couch this as a public good.
Building redistribution into the tax structure itself may have
advantages over a simpler (head or flat) taxation scheme followed by
additional transfers to achieve the same result. One advantage is
purely administrative in nature. Taxing people who subsequently
receive net positive transfer payments to achieve distributive goals
moves money around needlessly. Progressive taxes also seem to
enjoy popular support, although people seem to view them less
favorably when
confronted with examples that reveal how these taxes
10 5
actually work.
103. See id. at 54 (discussing the "ability to pay" principle of fair taxation).
104. See id. (presenting this argument, but noting that it is also "unprovable" because of the
impossibility of making interpersonal utility comparisons).
105. Despite broad popular support for progressivity as a concept, the results of one study
that asked respondents to answer concrete questions about fair taxation "do not indicate that a
majority of the sample prefer taxes that increase progressively, that is, more than
proportionately to increases in income." Michael L. Roberts et al., UnderstandingAttitudes
Toward Progressive Taxation, 58 PUB. OP. Q. 165, 185 (1994). The authors suggest that the
public perception that well-off people do not pay a proportionate share of their income in taxes,
given the differential availability of tax avoidance opportunities, might explain this apparent
discrepancy. See id at 185-86. Another explanation suggests that people do not fully appreciate,
or cannot readily process, the difference between flat taxes that take more money (but the same
percentage) from the better-off, with truly progressive taxes that take a larger percentage from
the better-off. For example, it appears that people are susceptible to a "progressivity illusion"
when taxes are expressed in dollar rather than percentage terms. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY &
JONATHAN BARON, FRAMING THE FAMILY: EVALUATION

OF TAX POLICIES INVOLVING

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 14, 30, 33, 36 (USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No. 00-18,
Revised, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID246408_
code001023520. pdfabstractid=246408 (discussing this effect).

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 13:75

D. Opportunitiesfor Avoidance andEvasion
Where public goods games involve a forced contribution feature,
as did one of the experimental games in the Dawes study, the forced
contribution can be implemented perfectly. 0 6 In contrast, any realworld tax system includes opportunities for legal tax avoidance and
illegal tax evasion. Tax avoidance is generated by intentional or
unintentional gaps in the tax base that enable people to reduce tax
liability by selectively engaging in particular activities. Tax evasion
is a function of necessarily imperfect enforcement regimes. Scholars
have extensively analyzed the costs associated with tax avoidance
and evasion. 0 7 While we will not revisit those topics in detail here,
opportunities for avoidance and evasion108might impact tax aversion by
presenting opportunities for free riding.
As noted at the outset, instances of tax avoidance and evasion are
likely manifestations of tax aversion. It remains possible, however,
that they also exacerbate and perpetuate tax aversion. The dynamic is
similar to a simple public goods game in which baseline levels of
cooperation decay over time. Some people begin as noncooperators,
while others become noncooperators in reaction to the
noncooperation of other people. As in the public goods game,
taxpayers may believe that to avoid victimization from free riding, a
taxpayer must become a free rider herself. In other words, if
taxpayers perceive the game as offering a binary choice between
being a free rider or being a sucker, some number of would-be
cooperators will choose free riding, or at least the partial free riding
that accompanies tax avoidance or evasion.
Prohibiting all free riding would make these "reactive" free riders
happiest, but given a world in which some people do free ride, these
reactive people wish to be among the free riders.'0 9 Thus, closing up
106. Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175-78.
107. See supra notes 9, 12 (citing studies on tax evasion, avoidance and compliance
issues).
108. Some gaps in the tax base are intentional. If the behavioral shifts induced by these
gaps generate societal benefits that outweigh the lost revenue, then those who "avoid" taxes by
engaging in tax-preferred behaviors do not free ride. However, just as the uses of tax revenue
may be controversial, so too may be these tax preferences. See generally CITIZENS FOR TAX
JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN ENTITLEMENTS (1996) (criticizing certain tax expenditures).
109. Such reactive free riding parallels the phenomenon of conditional cooperation found
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gaps in the tax base or toughening enforcement might decrease free
riding in two ways: by actually keeping people from free riding, and
by making people believe that nobody else can get away with such
free riding. If most avoiders and evaders are of the "reactive" variety,
setting up a system that minimizes free riding should decrease tax
aversion.
Standard economic analysis posits that an optimum level of
enforcement exists. It is inefficient to catch every tax cheat; the
efficient solution minimizes the sum of evasion costs and
administrative and enforcement costs. 110 Similar analysis has been
applied to tax avoidance devices, such as tax shelters. If these
avoidance devices generate costly deadweight losses, perhaps making
avoidance easier for those who wish to avoid taxes will actually be
more efficient."' Yet if some proportion of avoidance and evasion is
of the "reactive" variety, then the optimum level of enforcement must
take into account the impact that instances of avoidance and evasion
could have on norms of compliance. Tightening up enforcement
might have a multiplier effect in inducing and sustaining cooperation;
in addition to increasing deterrence, enforcement might also reduce
the fear of free-riding by fostering a public perception that free riding
is not going to be tolerated.
Tax aversion also generates costs other than those captured by
avoidance and evasion behaviors. Wage-earning taxpayers who
cannot cobble together enough deductions to itemize have little
opportunity to evade or avoid taxation."12 Yet to the extent that taxes
cause them more pain than other expenditures of similar magnitude,
there is a social utility loss. Thus, even enforcement that appears
inefficient when compared with the amount of evasion detected or
deterred might actually yield latent benefits in the reduction of tax
in experimental economics studies. See, e.g., FISCHBACHER ET AL., supra note 79; Keser & van
Winden, supra note 7; see also Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax
Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39 (2003) (modeling dynamics of compliance norms
and behaviors among taxpayers).
110. See Becker, supra note 4, at 183-84.
111. See Weisbach, supranote 2, at 1669-71.
112. See Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of
Tax Cheating, I1 J. ECON. PsYcH. 341, 347 (1990) (observing that "[t]axpayers vary in terms
of the opportunities available to them to conceal income or declare unwarranted deductions
without risking detection").
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aversion. If we care about addressing tax aversion itself, and not just
its most obvious manifestations, then the role of enforcement in
shaping attitudes towards contributing to taxes deserves independent
attention.
Nevertheless, enforcement is a double-edged sword that can
produce unintentional results. For those presently in compliance, the
existence of extensive enforcement efforts may signal that free riding
is in fact rampant-a signal that might lead to more
noncompliance.11 3 In addition, an IRS that is perceived as
overzealous in prosecuting offenses may be viewed as treating
taxpayers unfairly or with undue levels of suspicion, thus generating
additional resentment about the tax system. 114 If the fact of
compulsion itself adds distaste to the tax payment context, heightened
enforcement efforts may operate to highlight the compulsory aspects
of the system, rather than the more "service-oriented" side of the
IRS's operations.
IV. THE ROLE OF

RECIPROCITY

Part III suggests that a real-world tax system, notwithstanding its
compulsory nature (and perhaps in part because of it), will continue
to contain features that generate aversion. A significant part of that
113. The Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted a study in 1995 that showed the
converse of this trend. The Department sent informational letters to a sample of state taxpayers,
informing them that tax compliance rates were in fact higher than the levels suggested in recent
public opinion polls. Those taxpayers thereafter reported more income and claimed fewer
deductions in their state tax returns. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE
MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5-6, 18-19 (1996),

available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/reports/complnce.pdf. A later study examined
changes in tax reporting conduct on both state and federal income tax returns, using a different
selection of data sets than those employed in the Minnesota Department of Revenue's study.
This later study found no statistically significant impact of the informational letters when
assessed with those different data sets. Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a ControlledExperiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 125
(2001). For a detailed discussion of these and other studies on norms of tax compliance, see
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2003), George Mason Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 3-12, 2003, at 18-21 & nn.87-112, available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=391133.
114. See, e.g., FREY & FELD, supra note 12, at 23 (observing that "when the tax officials
consider taxpayers purely as 'subjects' who have to be forced to pay their dues, the taxpayers
tend to respond by actively trying to avoid taxation").
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aversion relates to concerns about free riding. We can obtain a deeper
and richer understanding of what those concerns entail and how we
might ameliorate them from anthropological and sociological studies
of the phenomenon of reciprocity. Such analyses have identified
cross-cultural trends in belief systems and norms of conduct that are
consistent with findings in controlled experiments indicating that
reciprocity plays a central role in the success of repeat-play
interactions.
A. Structures and Scales of Reciprocity
Anthropological and sociological studies of exchange systems
across cultures indicate that exchange participants tend to prefer
balanced, reciprocal exchanges over systems of centralized collection
and redistribution." 5 Within systems of balanced reciprocity,
participants provide resources (human capital, goods, and services) to
each other on the understanding that they will receive clearly
comparable resource contributions in return. Such systems permit
delays, but the reciprocation must occur within reasonably
contemporaneous time spans. If participants in these exchange
systems obtain contributions without reciprocating in kind, other
contributors typically subject these non-reciprocating participants to
social condemnation, invoking social norms of expected degrees of
fairness in the exchanges. In addition, such failures of reciprocity
frequently result in participants' avoidance of future
exchanges with
16
noncontributing members of the exchange system.'
Public good experiments have examined the reciprocal
interactions of limited numbers of participants in face-to-face
interactions. These experiments have provided useful findings of the
115. See, e.g., MAURICE GODELIER, THE ENIGMA OF THE GIFT (Nora Scott trans., 1999);
ANNETTE B. WIENER, INALIENABLE POSSESSIONS: THE PARADOX OF KEEPING-WHILE-GIVING
(1992); Marshall Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in THE GIFT 26 (Aafke E.
Komter ed., 1996).
116. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 4-6 (Richard Nice trans.,
1977); CHRISTOPHER A. GREGORY, SAVAGE MONEY: THE ANTHROPOLOGY AND POLITICS OF
COMMODITY EXCHANGE 64-65 (1997); WEINER, supra note 115, at 28-33; Arjun Appadurai,
Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS 18-20 (Arjun Appadurai

ed., 1986); Henry Orenstein, Asymmetrical Reciprocity: A Contribution to the Theory of
PoliticalLegitimacy, 21 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 69, 69-70 (1980).
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degree to which members of Western societies have been socialized
with norms of reciprocation that often dominate over desires for selfinterested maximization. However, one cannot directly extrapolate
findings involving limited networks of face-to-face interactions to
settings involving social actors engaged in more abstract interactions
with centralized institutions. Nonetheless, the findings from
experiments concerning face-to-face interactions provide useful
insights, because small-scale networks form the building blocks of
the larger, centralized institutions which are of concern for a study of
tax aversion dynamics in American taxation.
In cultural systems with centralized institutions for collecting and
redistributing resources, the mechanisms of social interaction and
organization operate on both small and large scales. At the smaller
scale, social integration is maintained through reciprocal, largely
face-to-face interactions of individual actors within particular groups.
At the larger scale, there are less face-to-face interactions of
participants, and instead a greater role for institutional forms of
communication and action between groups representing those
individuals. The larger-scale systemic integration is built upon, and
depends upon, the closer-scale modes of social integration." 7
Taxpayers in systems of centralized redistribution often perceive
those exchange systems as involving degrees of expropriation
because the levels of taxation and other required contributions do not
appear justifiable on the basis of clearly identifiable public goods
received in return. As a result, groups controlling the collection and
redistribution systems develop and utilize other elements of social
structure to counter the participants' aversion to making such
contributions, and to deter noncompliance." 8 These elements include
institutions for imposing the controlling groups' power over the
participants, and elaborate ideologies that legitimate their authority
117. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION,
STRUCTURE AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 76-81 (1979); WEINER, supra note
115, at 29-30; ERIC R. WOLF, PATHWAYS OF POWER: BUILDING AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE
MODERN WORLD 167-68 (2001).
118. See, e.g., ABNER COHEN, Two-DIMENSIONAL MAN: AN ESSAY ON THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER AND SYMBOLISM IN COMPLEX SOCIETY 119-38 (1976); Jonathan
Friedman, Culture, Identity and World Process, in DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE 246-60
(Daniel Miller et al. eds., 1989); Orenstein, supra note 116, at 70-73.
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within the society.'" 9
In smaller-scale interactions of identifiable participants, each
participant tends to judge the fairness of the interaction by her
perceptions of each other participant's behavior and motivations.
This is consistent with results of experimental studies showing that
the perceived motives of other players matter greatly in assessments
of fairness by a given player. 120 Thus, participants express norms of
reciprocation to reward or punish others in these smaller-scale
interactions. 12 When the forum of interaction moves to a broader
scale, however, the focus of individual participants falls more on the
perceived character of the things exchanged (whether in amounts of
money capital, human capital, or commodities) and the fairness of the
exchange of values conveyed through those items. 122 One
interpretation of this shift in focus is that individual participants'
motives become more difficult to accurately assess as group size
increases. Therefore, a participant must rely on the perceived values
of the goods received and given to assess whether her partners in the
interaction treated her fairly.
Alvin Gouldner's broad survey of anthropological and
sociological studies of the norm of reciprocity across cultures found
that this norm is practically a universal component of cultural
systems. 123 However, the particular characteristics and dynamics of a
norm of reciprocity can vary significantly among cultural settings.
Reciprocity exists not only in smaller social groups engaged in
ritualized gift exchange, but also in larger social settings where
reciprocity entails an interdependence of participants in an increasing
119. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 116, at 70-73.
120. See, e.g., Fong et al., supra note 48, at 8-9 (explaining that in ultimatum and dictator
games, "[plunishment is triggered by responders' beliefs about the intentions of the proposer").
121. See, e.g., Igor Kopytoff, The Cultural Biography of Things: Commodification as
Process, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS 68-70 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986).
122. See, e.g., Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND
TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 5-6 (1977); GREGORY, supra note 116; WEINER, supra note

115, at 28-30; Duran Bell, Modes of Exchange: Gift and Commodity, 20 J. OF SOCIOECONOMICS 155, 165 (1991); Edward L. Schieffelin, Reciprocity and the Construction of
Reality, 15 MAN (n. s.) 502 (Sept. 1980); see also Appadurai, supra note 116, at 11-12.
123. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A PreliminaryStatement, 25 AM. SOC.
REV. 161, 171 (1960). While some aspects of Gouldner's analysis received criticism due to
contrary evidence in later ethnographic studies, several key features of reciprocity described by
Gouldner remain supported by a broad array of anthropological research efforts.
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division and specialization 24of labor, as well as the exchange of
capital, goods, and services. 1
In its most basic characteristics across cultures, a norm of
reciprocity "makes two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people
should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not
injure those who have helped them.' ' 125 In some cultures, reciprocity
acts as a fundamental organizing principle in the operations of
political and economic institutions of centralized governments.126 In
other large-scale and complex cultural systems, such as the United
States, the political and economic institutions of centralized
government have become rationalized and legitimized in the belief
systems of that culture. 21 In such contexts, the operations of
reciprocity may remain "endemic" among members of the culture,
but are not carried out28overtly in the operations of these centralized
economic institutions.
A primary aspect of reciprocity that varies from one cultural
setting to another is the way in which participants affix values to
particular things exchanged, and thereby determine what things have
equivalent values within the context of their exchanges. In many
cultural systems, "equivalence may mean that the things exchanged
may be completely different, but should be equal in value as defined
by the actors in the situation.' 29 In other cultures and group
interactions, "equivalence may mean that exchanges should be
concretely alike, or identical in form, either with respect to the things
exchanged 'or
to the circumstances under which they are
30
exchanged."'
A number of anthropological studies of reciprocal exchange
systems have found that loss avoidance is a key concern. For
example, Schieffelin examined the role of a norm of reciprocity in the
creation and maintenance of social ties among the Kaluli people of
124. Id.at 169-70.
125. Id. at 171.
126. Id.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.

129. Id.at 172.
130. Id,
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Papua New Guinea. 131 Even in exchanges among smaller groups of
identifiable participants, the actors perceived the things they
exchanged as imbued with cultural meaning that provided a basis for
placing particular valuations on each exchanged thing. When one
participant conveyed an item of value to another, it created an
imbalance between them until the recipient responded by conveying
something to the donor of equivalent value under the circumstances
of the relationship. The Kaluhi people thus perceive reciprocity as
being driven by the social necessity of redressing the loss sustained
by the first donor in order to restore and maintain the ongoing social
relationships between that donor and the recipient. Therefore,
exchanges were motivated not just by the positive value of enhancing
social relationships through donations, but also by the converse fear
of sustaining unredressed3 losses
and a breakdown in the social order
2
1
network.
exchange
the
of
What relevance does such a reciprocity norm have in a setting in
which an institutionalized governmental body compels payments
from individuals, and where different classes of people are stratified
economically and politically into a hierarchy of different status
levels? In such a setting, one would expect social actors of higher
status to extract benefits from participants of lower status without a
concern for reciprocity. Cultural beliefs and social norms that
legitimate the higher status of certain members of that society would
sustain such asymmetric exchanges. Similarly, the political and
economic institutions of a centralized government operating in such a
stratified society might extract payments from its citizens
without
33
providing direct reciprocation to each paying participant.
However, surveying the findings of numerous studies of
reciprocity in different cultural settings, Gouldner observed:
Not only does the norm of reciprocity play a stabilizing role in
human relations in the absence of a well developed system of
special status duties, but it contributes to social stability even
when these are present and well established. Status duties
131. Schieffelin, supra note 122.
132. Id. at 513-15.
133. See, e.g., Orenstein, supranote 116, at 70-73.
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shape behavior because the status occupant believes them
binding in their own right; they possess a kind of primafacie
legitimacy for properly socialized group members. The general
norm of reciprocity, however, is a second-order defense of
stability; it provides a further source of motivation and an
additional moral
sanction for conforming with specific status
13 4
obligations.

Different elements of enculturated norms and collective ideologies
can thus play out at multiple scales of interaction-from the policy
rhetoric deployed by administrators of centralized redistribution to
the decisions of conformity or deviation by individual participants in
35
small-group interactions.'
How might these insights from anthropological and sociological
studies inform an analysis of taxpaying behavior in the United States?
Experimental studies have already attempted to identify strategies
corresponding to those used at the large and small scales of reciprocal
interactions to legitimate centralized tax collection. 136 The results
suggest that trust in government and in other citizens buttresses tax
compliance. 37 However, additional work is necessary to augment and
translate these insights into meaningful tax policy directives.
In addition to the challenges of centralized collection presented by
the American tax system, the system also, controversially, effects
redistribution. The type of redistribution that receives the most
attention-that from the better-off to the less well-off-presents
sharp concerns about free riding. 138 Here, too, we can see reactions
that correspond to small and large scale strategies. On the one hand,
we have seen the devolution of certain social welfare programs to the
state and local level, a move premised, in part, on the supposed
134. Gouldner, supra note 123, at 175-76.
135. See, e.g., id.; GIDDENS, supra note 117, at 76-81.
136. See, e.g., John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic
Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 398 (1998).
137. ld. at 411-13.
138. In fact, transfers to the poor constitute only a small subset of all societal redistribution.
See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF REDISTRIBUTION I (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that
"if we use redistribution to mean all cases in which the government transfers funds or wealth
from one group of people to another, it is a much larger phenomenon than the rather modest
transfers to the poor").
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greater ability of local institutions to assess the needs and motives of
would-be recipients. 139 On the other hand, we see the use of rhetoric
140
and social control mechanisms to legitimate these expenditures.
However, these strategies may be insufficient to overcome the
perceived lapses of reciprocity that redistribution introduces into the
tax system.
To pinpoint these shortcomings, we must evaluate the American
tax system in terms of its satisfaction of enculturated norms of
reciprocity. In subpart B, we work through two models of exchange:
the market exchange model, and a model of non-market reciprocity
through repeat-play and gift-giving. The federal tax system does not
fit comfortably within either of these templates. In subpart C, we
consider how and whether certain components of reciprocity, or
proxies for those components, might be introduced into the federal
tax system.
B. Markets and Other ReciprocalExchanges
1. Market Exchange
The most familiar and ubiquitous form of bilateral exchange in
modem, developed countries is the market exchange. One can also
139. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretion, and
EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1145-73 (2000) (discussing degree of
discretion given to front-line administrative personnel in administering Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) and in making individual determinations about matters such as the
needs and abilities to work of would-be recipients); see also Wax, supra note 98, at 270
(explaining that "[t]he need to judge what persons seeking benefits can do or have done for
themselves or others will drive a keen interest in the behavior and conduct of would-be
beneficiaries"); supra Part 1lI.B (discussing difficulty in distinguishing "needy riders" from
"free riders").
140. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF, contained a number of
rhetorical and structural features designed to address perceived problems with free riding,
including the express disavowal of any person's entitlement to benefits and the addition of work
requirements, sanctions, and time limits. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 106TH
CONG., 2000 GREEN BOOK, SECTION 7: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 352-54

(Comm. Print 2000) (discussing these and other changes effected by the legislation); see
generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE

FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993) (discussing historical control of welfare
recipients).
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conceive of taxes in these terms; indeed, the "benefit approach" to
taxation does exactly that. 141 However, there are two impediments to
the use of this model in the federal taxation context. The first
impediment arises from the rhetorical, temporal, and spatial
separation of the collection function of government from the benefitproviding functions of government. 142 Only rarely do the collection
and benefit sides of government unite in time and space, in a single
interaction informed by coherent policy rhetoric. We do not know of
any in-depth study of the psychological impact of putting money
through a window and receiving a tangible representation of a benefit
through that same window in return, but the sense of reciprocity
engendered in the transaction must be much greater than in the
typical taxpaying setting. 143
Other settings in which either rhetorical or actual connections
have been drawn between payments and benefits include school bond
issues, the earmarked use of lottery revenues, 44 and the earmarking
of payroll taxes for Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment
Insurance. 45 Local governments have also employed the imagery of a
141. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62 (1959) ("In the benefit
approach, the relation of taxpayer and government is seen, as John Stuart Mill puts it, in quid
pro quo terms. Since the relation is one of exchange, the rules of the public household are taken
to be more or less the same as those of the market.").
142. E.g., Rosenberg, supranote 18, at 179-83.
143. Examples of such "single-window" transactions include many forms of governmentissued licenses (e.g., licenses to hunt, fish, marry, operate a vehicle, keep a pet, or enter a public
park). The individual's control over the choice whether to engage in the underlying activity, and
the evident value that the individual places on the privilege she is obtaining, likely make the
interaction more palatable. See CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (reporting experimental
results of laboratory investigations conducted with subjects in the United States, South Africa,
and Botswana that "provide support for the hypothesis that tax compliance increases with
individual perceptions that the tax system is fair and that the government is providing valued
goods and services with the revenues"); id. at 6 n.7 (IRS survey results show "individuals react
negatively to the perception that they have no control over the use of their taxes"); James Aim
et al., Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 288 (1993) (reporting results of laboratory experiments showing tax
compliance "is significantly higher when individuals vote on the use of their taxes than when
the identical [spending plan] is imposed upon them"); cf Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 229-30
(suggesting media campaigns to emphasize public goods and services the federal government
provides using tax revenues).
144.

See, e.g.,

CHARLES T. CLOTFELDER

& PHILIP J. COOK,

SELLING HOPE: STATE

LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 227-28 (1989) (discussing the earmarking of state lottery revenues and
the likelihood that it has little or no impact on spending patterns).
145. See ROSEN, supra note 2, at 184-85, 196 (explaining that payroll taxes fund Social
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unified exchange in campaigns to support the payment of taxes. For
example, a 1934 Memphis advertising poster depicted a customer
receiving a basket of identifiable public goods in exchange for his
monetary payment. 146 However, the federal income tax system lacks

such

connections.

The

efficiency

justifications

for

agency

specialization are obvious, but severance of all connections between
any
the collection of taxes and the provision
147 of benefits eliminates

semblance of a quid pro quo exchange.
The second difficulty is the aforementioned fear of free riding.
The failure of some members of society to contribute their shares to
the provision of the public good prevents the individual taxpayer
from receiving full value for her money in the interaction. Indeed, the
existence of free riders may independently generate disutility that
makes the deal even worse in experiential terms than would be
suggested by the gap between payments and benefits. Thus, even if it
were possible to arrange matters so that people directly associated the
benefits received with the taxes going into the system, taxpayers
would still need reassurance that others had not contributed less while
receiving more. 148 A system that incorporates a measure of

intentional redistribution, whether through transfer programs or
through cross-subsidization built directly into the tax system in the
and gaps in the tax base, cannot provide such
form of progressivity
49
assurance. 1

Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance).
146. Poster from the 1934 the Memphis Pay Your Taxes Campaign, Good Merchandise
Fairly Priced, U.S. MUN. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1935, reprinted in DAVID T. BEITO, TAXPAYERS IN
REVOLT 122 (1989).
147. This is not to suggest that it would always be easy to draw rhetorical connections
between government collections and expenditures. Some benefits generated by government
expenditures take an indirect or intangible form that makes such connections more difficult to
draw. For example, the direct benefits of welfare payments only go to the poor, but the
payments yield an important set of ambient benefits for society as a whole (such as the chance
to live in a society in which young children do not starve). Because these ambient benefits arise
only indirectly from the government expenditures, non-poor individuals may have difficulty
recognizing that they receive any benefit at all from the tax dollars spent on poverty relief.
148. See Alm et al., supra note 143, at 290, 301 (showing tax compliance rates in
laboratory experiments were highest when subjects could vote for how taxes were spent and
were informed of widespread support for the public goods provided; the researchers inferred
that subjects perceived that strong support for a good would translate into high rates of payment
for that good by the other participants).
149. More explicitly drawing the connection between taxes and benefits could even
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2. Wider Frames of Exchange
We can best introduce another brand of exchange potentially
implicated in public goods interactions by contrasting it with the
market exchange model just discussed. Market exchanges often
involve the immediate, anonymous exchange of a good or service for
currency. The availability of a generalized medium of exchange that
stores value (money) makes it unnecessary for the parties to an
exchange to await the moment when each has something intrinsically
valued by the other to complete the deal.' 50 Contracts offer a device
for temporally offsetting the moves in the exchange,' 5 ' while
products such as credit can further widen the time-span for
performance. Notably, contract transactions accomplish all of these
functions within the framework of a market-based interaction in
which the individual identities of the participants are unimportant.
Outside of the marketplace (and even within it, where repeat play
is involved), exercises in reciprocity often diverge from this marketbased model of exchange. The time span between giving and
receiving can widen without the aid of market products such as
credit, or formal devices such as contracts. Factors like trust and
reputation begin to play a role in sustaining the parties' cooperation.
Much anthropological and sociological literature analyzes gift
exchange, which
some view as a kind of slow-motion market
52
transaction.
In other words, widening the frame of reference can often address
the above-mentioned concerns with free riding. 153 A degree of
sharpen the sense of unfairness for some if these individuals learned how much they paid for
particular benefits as compared to others. As a collateral matter, these individuals might
fundamentally disagree with some of the ends of taxation, thereby widening the perceived
margin between taxes paid and benefits received.
150. See supra note 122 (citing studies of market and commodity exchange structures).
151.

See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION 13-14 (1981) (discussing use of contracts to transform future exchange into
present exchange); see also YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS,
LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE 90-91 (2002) (discussing use of contracts to

address exchange over time as opposed to immediate exchange); DENNIS C. MUELLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 227 (1996) (discussing the same).

152. E.g., BOURDIEU, supra note 116, at 5-7; Kopytoff, supra note 121, at 68-69.
153.

Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in ConstitutionalLaw, 111 YALE L.J.

1311 (2002) (discussing the significance of how widely or narrowly one "frames" a given
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patience or a broader view of the interaction can turn what might
initially seem to be a case of free riding into a reciprocal move in an
ongoing interaction. For example, one who invests time, effort, and
money in helping a family member appears to make a bad deal if we
look narrowly at the balance sheet at a given moment. However,
examining the situation over time might reveal a more balanced
picture in which the assisted family member becomes an assisting
family member.
Another way in which people in the real world "widen their
frames" involves the recognition of benefits that they receive by
helping those they care about. We speak here not of payback for
earlier favors or the banking of future favors, but rather of a
recognition that one's own well-being is to some extent bound up
with that of people to whom one has certain ties. Relatedly, members
of small groups may feel their own successes belong, at least in part,
to those who have participated in their lives, so that sharing does not
as clearly involve a transformation of something that is strictly
personal property into a transfer to another.
Experimental literature and anthropological studies agree that
small groups whose members readily identify with each other have an
easier time sustaining cooperation. There are several reasons for this.
First, informal pressures and social sanctions may be ineffective in
large group settings. 5 4 Relatedly, where the provision of public
goods involves large disparate groups, as it does in the federal
taxation context, individuals do not likely perceive themselves as
cooperating with others in a meaningful sense. Equally unlikely is the
perception that noncooperation in large-scale settings constitutes the
sort of "free riding" that actually harms others. 55 When a person does
transaction in determining its constitutionality).
154. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 62 (1965) (positing that
"[i]n
general, social pressure and social incentives operate only in groups of smaller size, in the
groups so small that the members can have face-to-face contact with one another").
155. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 87 (1968)

(contending that the term "free rider" is something of a misnomer in large-number settings
involving the provision of public goods because an individual "has no sensation of securing
benefits at the expense of others in any personal manner"); see also EDNA ULLMANNMARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 28-29 (1977) (describing the "condition of individual
insignificance," where each individual contribution is so small and difficult to trace that it
appears to have no impact on the overall result, and where defection is "not at the personal
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not perceive that her actions have a personal impact on other
individuals, she will be less reluctant to free ride. 56 Finally, members
of a small, cohesive group will likely have a greater degree of
interdependence in their utility functions than members of a larger
group.
Small-group settings also allow enormous transparency in the
reciprocal interaction. Members of small groups can personally
assess the motives and situations of the other players in a manner not
possible in large group settings. For example, in our winter
expedition example,' 57 the hatted players could easily perceive the
equipment requirements of the hatless players, and the hatted players
could assess whether the hatless players were strategically hatless or
hatless through no fault of their own. Both the donors and the
recipients could view the redistribution, and the donors could also
monitor the recipients' use of the donated hats. Moreover, the donors
could assess the recipients' action or inaction in the face of later
opportunities to reciprocate.
One might question whether the impersonal nature of the large
scale setting makes free riding a less acute concern. Free riding is
likely to be more commonplace in large group settings for the reasons
noted, but might those settings involve a lesser degree of the psychic
pain associated with being "suckered"? Little or no systematic study
and analysis of this possibility exists. However, popular outcry over
welfare-a program that involves a special category of perceived free
riders-was an important catalyst of reform. Political animosity
towards welfare has far outweighed the relatively small monetary
expenditure associated with it, leading some to believe that the
animosity stems not from the cost of the program but from the
expectations regarding reciprocity. 158 This suggests that the large
group setting sheds the benefits that might make reciprocity more
expense of any of the other participants and is moreover likely to go entirely unnoticed by

them").
156. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 155, at 29 (explaining that possible inhibitions
about "the infliction of direct and personal damage on one's partners" would not be operative in
settings "where the condition of individual insignificance is satisfied").

157. See supra Part l.B.
158. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 98, at 272-74; Fong et al., supra note 48, at 21.

2003]

Fear and Greed in Tax Policy

viable without introducing any countervailing benefits in the form of
lessened psychic pain and increased tolerance for free riding.
C. Components and Proxies
Even a superficial look at the federal tax system raises serious
doubts about its ability to embody a robust notion of reciprocity.
Taxation at the federal level does not remotely resemble strict "for
value" market exchanges, given the fact that benefits are temporally,
spatially, and rhetorically removed from payments. Moreover, the
large numbers of people involved and the high social distance
between them retards any move towards a wider-framed
understanding of the reciprocal interaction. No ability exists to
directly observe the motives or circumstances of other taxpayers or
recipients, potentially sharpening concerns about free riding. 5 9 At the
same time, free riding becomes more attractive because taxpayers do
not perceive it as personally harming other individuals. Finally,
people will likely feel a strong sense of entitlement to their gross
income. 160
Even if interjecting a stronger sense of reciprocity into the federal
tax system would reduce tax aversion, the possibilities for doing so
are significantly constrained. If we want to make progress, we must
identify particular components found in reciprocal interactions and
transplant them into the federal taxation arena, or, alternatively, find
proxies for the features that exist in robust reciprocal interactions. For
example, some recent and ongoing work investigates whether the
Internal Revenue Service's treatment of taxpayers affects compliance
levels. 16 1 This work incorporates notions of reciprocity by querying
whether, for example, a courteous, fair, and helpful IRS triggers a
reciprocal reaction from taxpayers in the form of heightened
159. See, e.g., ARMIN FALK & URS FiSCHBACHER, A THEORY OF RECIPROCITY 20 (Ctr. for
Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 457, 2001),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/000105406.pdf?abstractid=203115; Fehr & Gachter,
supra note 37, at 162-63.
160. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 25-26, 30-36 (discussing claims of moral
property rights in pretax income).
161. See, e.g., FREY & FELD, supra note 12, at 22-23; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance
and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=391134.

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 13:75

compliance levels.
Could the IRS potentially serve as a proxy for all of the other
members of society who engage in the taxpaying game? If taxpayers
viewed the agency as a composite "good citizen"-a fiscally aware
"Smokey the Bear" type of character' 62-this might reduce the
present, large-scale taxpaying game to a small-group (two-player)
game between the taxpayer and the anthropomorphized agency.
However, this approach has limits. While people might behave
marginally better when treated well by an agency that has an
attractive public image, some forms of free riding that may be of
concern to taxpayers occur outside of the jurisdiction of the agency.
In addition, a single-purpose agency devoted to collection of taxes
might have difficulty fostering the sort of wide-frame view of the
societal interaction that can make the interaction appear more
reciprocal.
Another feature alluded to above is that of transparency-the
ability to see and evaluate the reciprocal moves. In small-group
interactions, where voluntary contributions dominate, transparency is
tightly linked to the notion of control. If a participant believes that the
group interaction has become too imbalanced, she can simply stop
contributing, secure in the knowledge that this punishes those
individuals who failed to exhibit sufficient reciprocity in their
dealings. In contrast, the uses made of tax money are less transparent.
At a minimum, there are significant costs in learning where one's
dollars go. Political action affords only the bluntest form of control;
each voter can only "purchase" a bundle of issue positions advocated
by a given representative. In addition, the motives, circumstances,
and contributions of the other members of society are not transparent.
Certain kinds of transparencies, such as knowledge of where taxes
go, and the amounts other contributors pay, could be enhanced in the
federal tax system at relatively low cost. A remaining question,
though, is whether heightened transparency does any good-or
whether, indeed, it does harm-when presented in isolation from
meaningful control. One might argue that knowing more about the

162. For background on Smokey the Bear and similar public service advertising
campaigns, see PAUL RUTHERFORD, ENDLESS PROPAGANDA: THE ADVERTISING OF PUBLIC
GOODS 26-29 (2000).
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tax system actually makes people like it less. While the answer
remains unclear, a possibility worth investigating is whether a proxy
for control-the exercise of voice-might mitigate this concern. In
other words, introducing a transparency-voice bundle into the federal
taxation system might carry many of the advantages of the
transparency-control bundle we see in successful small-group
interactions.
V. BUILDING A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AGENDA

In this final section of the paper, we present some possible ways
of operationalizing the insights gleaned from existing empirical
literature as it relates to the phenomenon of tax aversion. However, as
we have noted throughout the paper, the existing empirical literature
contains many gaps. There is little or no direct work on the
phenomena that most interests us-the contours, dynamics, causes,
and cures of tax aversion. As the anthropological and behavioral
literature emphasizes, context is critically important, and one cannot
simply lift lessons from one experimental context and apply them to
the very different context of federal taxation. L keeping with this
understanding of the limits of the existing work, we do not present
the ideas in this section as policy proposals for immediate universal
adoption. Rather, we mean to provide tentative sketches for
experimental designs that might be attempted, perhaps as pilot
programs, in the federal taxation context.
A. TransparentTaxpaying
One could design programs to test the effects of making taxpaying
more transparent to taxpayers. We have in mind two distinct sorts of
transparency. The first involves making the use of specific tax
monies transparent to taxpayers. Even an extraordinarily motivated
taxpayer would encounter great difficulty in attempting to learn
where her income tax dollars go. Federal income tax instruction
booklets do contain an "outlay" pie chart that shows the breakdown
of the federal budget. 163 Yet this budget shows overall federal
163.

Internal

Revenue

Service,

2002

1040 Instructions

2

(2002), available at
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expenditures; it does not show only the expenditures funded by the
income tax. Payroll taxes, which fund a specific slate of social
benefits, account for thirty-five percent of federal receipts. 164 Because
the "outlay" pie chart includes expenditures funded by payroll taxes
as well as expenditures funded by income taxes, an individual
glancing at the chart might misapprehend the
proportion of her
165
income tax dollars flowing to various programs.
A taxpayer who undertakes to construct her own pie chart
showing only the uses made of income tax receipts will find this a
daunting task. Like the instruction booklet pie chart, the official
budget documents break down expenditures in various ways but do
not provide a functional breakdown of the expenditures funded only
by the income tax.' 66 Therefore, a taxpayer would have to know
which programs income tax does not fund, identify and subtract the
amounts of the related budget lines, and calculate overall percentages
for each category and subcategory based on the remaining totals. This
would require many tedious hours poring over government
documents and making calculations. Only after painstakingly
calculating percentages for each function funded by the income tax
could a taxpayer apply these percentages to her own income tax bill
to determine how the government spends her income tax dollars. This
level of non-transparency is stunning, given the relative ease with
167
which the government could provide this information to taxpayers.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i 1040gi.pdf.
164. See id. (providing "income" chart).
165. The misconceptions potentially generated by this pie chart are highly significant if we
think that redistribution of the sort that accompanies social programs raises heightened fears
about free riding.
166. See Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2004, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budgetl
fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf (providing detailed tables showing government outlays broken down by
function, category, and agency; and showing breakdowns of government receipts by source; but
showing no functional breakdown ofjust the subset of expenditures funded by the income tax).
Some organizations provide online charts and other information regarding the uses made of
federal income tax revenue, but a taxpayer encountering these breakdowns would have to
independently investigate and assess the validity of the data and the methodology used to
achieve these results, and consider the extent to which the results might be influenced by each
group's political objectives. These concerns are not entirely avoided when a governmental body
provides the breakdown, but they are minimized by the use of official data, standard category
terms, and generally accepted methods of aggregating and presenting data.
167. Oregon, for example, provides the breakdown of its use of income tax revenues in a
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While a simple printed pie chart showing the uses of income tax
monies would provide a major advance, the ubiquity of computerized
tax preparation software makes an even more transparent interface
feasible. For example, after a taxpayer completes an income tax
return on a computer 68 a software program could easily provide a pie
chart showing the percentages of income tax revenue dedicated to
various functions and applying those percentages to the taxpayer's
annual income tax bill. This would inform a taxpayer exactly how
many of her dollars flow to each governmental function. The
software could initially present taxpayers with a pie chart showing
broad categories of federal income tax expenditures. By clicking on a
slice of the pie, a taxpayer would reach subsidiary charts showing
expenditure details. At an appropriate level of detail, the taxpayer
would encounter links to government webpages describing the
individual tax-funded program.
Another type of transparency that might be built into such a
software program involves other taxpayers' actions. The government
could easily provide taxpayers with information (perhaps based on a
previous year's taxes) indicating the median and mean dollar amount
of taxes people in various income strata and household configurations
pay. A computer interface could personalize this information by
telling an individual taxpayer whether her tax contribution falls above
or below the median or mean amount of taxes for someone in her
income range and filing status. 169 This interface could even indicate
the percentile into which the taxpayer falls. Again, while a taxpayer
could theoretically construct this information from publicly-available
data, building it directly into the tax preparation context would
dramatically lower the costs of obtaining this information.
user-friendly format online. Oregon Department of Revenue, Services Paid for with Oregon
Income Tax Dollars (Fiscal Year 2001-02), at http://www.dor.state.or.us/taxInfo/Poster.html.
168. The IRS has recently launched a new internet-based electronic filing program
designed to reach a majority of American taxpayers. Internal Revenue Service, Free File, at
http://www.irs.gov/app/freeFile/welcome.jsp; see Alex Frangos, Use the Web to File Taxes,

WALL ST. J., SUNDAY (available in THE ADVOCATE & GREENWICH TIME) Jan. 19, 2003, at F3.
169. Tax preparation software has already begun to provide this information. The 2002
edition of TurboTax® Deluxe contains a feature called "U.S. Averages Comparison" that
compares the individual taxpayer's earned income, other income, itemized deductions, and tax
liability with those of others in her adjusted gross income range, using year 2000 IRS data
adjusted by a consumer price index factor.
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We could then study the effects of this pilot project on the amount
and quality of tax aversion. On the one hand, the program could more
concretely connect benefits with tax payments, perhaps making the
interaction feel more reciprocal. It might also correct common
misperceptions. For example, a person who has long resented
taxation because she imagines that most of her tax money flows to
"lazy" welfare recipients might view taxation differently when she
learns how few of her tax dollars actually go to the welfare program.
It might also allow an individual to see she is not a "sucker"
contributing to the tax system while everyone else free rides. Thus,
transparency might enhance the legitimacy of the governmental
agencies responsible for collecting and spending funds, while
simultaneously increasing compliance levels. 170
On the other hand, the possibility exists that greater transparency
might actually lead to greater hostility regarding taxpaying as
taxpayers learn exactly how much of their money flows to programs
they do not support and as they learn with greater precision the
degree to which their own contributions subsidize others (whether
recipients of redistributive programs, or fellow contributors who pay
smaller amounts in tax).' 17 Yet, absolute levels of tax aversion may
matter less than the practical consequences of that aversion. While
the analysis in this paper suggests that tax aversion typically takes the
socially destructive forms of avoidance, evasion, and unfocused
disutility, the possibility remains that tax aversion could be
"functional" in the sense that it motivates people to take political
action aimed at rectifying perceived problems in public finance. In
other words, disutility can function in a democracy much like pain in
a physiological system, alerting
the actor to take ameliorative steps to
172
avoid permanent damage.

170.

See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS,

POLITICAL LiBERALISM

66-71

(1993)

(discussing the

importance of publicity in legitimating governmental institutions); Tom R. Tyler, Justice, SelfInterest, and the Legitimacy of Legal and PoliticalAuthority, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 171

(Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing the impact of government legitimacy on citizen
compliance).
171. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1874-86 (suggesting that hidden taxes may be more
palatable to taxpayers).
172.

See ROBERT E. LANE, THE Loss OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 230 (2000)

(arguing that expressions of pain in a democratic system can serve "to make that system more
responsive to popular needs and demands").
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But aversion, like pain, is only useful to the extent that it prompts
useful corrective action. Because corrective action requires
information, one benefit of transparency is the improved political
efficacy of the citizenry. 73 Hence, we would not expect or want a
transparent tax system to merely generate hedonic gains for
taxpayers, but rather to transform aversion that is now blindly
directed towards taxation in general into political sentiments that are
more finely focused, and hence potentially more functional. Rather
than simply feeling vaguely cheated by the system, taxpayers could
address the specific programs (or particular features of the tax
system) that engender a sense of waste or unfairness.
Two issues threaten to puncture this optimistic vision. First, it is
questionable how much difference any taxpayer's angst can make (no
matter how finely tuned) in a system in which majoritarian
preferences are arguably subordinated to interest group politics.
Second, given the fact that an individual taxpayer can do virtually
nothing about a particular source of angst, one might question the
extent to which taxpayers will even bother to examine the uses of
their tax money. The next section offers a potential mechanism for
addressing these concerns.
B. Adding Voice: "The Taxpayer's Budget"
We hypothesize that a meaningful taxpayer "voice" might
alleviate the concerns about powerlessness by serving as a proxy for
taxpayer control. To test this hypothesis, we propose adding an
additional interactive feature to the interface in the pilot project
described above. We contemplate a simple software program that
enables taxpayers to move seamlessly from a "budget-viewing" mode
into a "budget-making" mode. In "budget-making" mode, taxpayers
could express their budgetary preferences by revising the pie chart

173.

See, e.g., Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54

HASTINGS L.J. 603, 605-08 (2003) (discussing the importance of information in a democracy);
Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO

N.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (1999) (discussing advantages of transparency in tax rules); see also
Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition,

89 GEO. L.J. 543, 600-03 (2001) (discussing impact of increased transparency on tax avoidance
schemes in various jurisdictions).
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(and the subsidiary pie charts subsumed within each slice) to reflect
their preferred allocations of their tax dollars. 7 4 We contemplate an
intuitive interface that permits a taxpayer to use a computer mouse to
grab the edge of a given pie slice and widen or narrow it. For each
such move, the taxpayer could have the option of automatically
readjusting every other slice proportionally or of making additional
adjustments manually.
Of course, we do not contemplate allowing taxpayers to directly
control the budget in this fashion; the interface would make very
clear to the taxpayer that the "budget-making" mode merely conveys
information about the taxpayer's preferred allocation. However, the
government could aggregate all of the individual allocations (or a
representative sample) to construct a publicly-available "taxpayer's
budget" that shows how taxpayers would spend tax dollars, if given
the power. If the news media compared this aggregate against the real
budget, it could serve as a focal point for public discourse and
political debate, potentially influencing government spending
patterns. This dynamic could conceivably operate as a counterweight
to any real or perceived dominance of the political process by special
interest groups. We might also expect this program to encourage
some improvements in public relations work among governmental
agencies, in an effort to win a vote of confidence from the
citizenry.7 5
Operationalizing this idea, even within the context of a limited
experimental program, would require us to address several
fundamental questions. First, we would need to decide on the basis of
174. At least one experimental study found that subjects allowed to choose between two
options for expenditures of the group funds to which they had contributed, experienced
increased satisfaction with the taxation and expenditure system in which they participated. Aim
et al., supra note 143. The budget allocation we propose here would offer participants a greater
array of choices. Perhaps suggesting the appeal of such an approach, our hometown newspaper,
the Austin American-Statesman, has recently created an interactive online "budget game" to
accompany its coverage of the 78th Texas Legislature. See The Budget Game,
http://www.statesman.com/insight/content/norails/budgetgame. The game enables people to
choose the budget cuts and new revenue sources that they would use to bridge the state's
budgetary shortfall, and provides commentary on the likely political fallout associated with
each choice. See Gary Susswein & Juan B. Elizondo, Jr., Play the Budget Game!, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 13, 2003, p. El (explaining the game and providing a hard copy
version).
175. Aim et al., supra note 143, at 301-02.
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our "taxpayer's budget." We could base the budget on the "dollar
votes" of taxpayers so that the chosen allocations of someone with
more tax dollars to allocate would have more weight in the aggregate
pie chart. Another approach would give equal weight to the
preferences
of each taxpayer, regardless of the amount of tax she
17 6
pays.

There are political and philosophical arguments for both the
"dollar vote" and the "equal vote" approaches. Giving those who pay
larger amounts a "louder" voice in any political arena may seem
morally repugnant at first blush, but the case for doing so grows
stronger if we think that part of what fuels tax aversion is a concern
with cross-subsidization. Moreover, if one believes that those with
more money already have a louder voice, a tax-dollar-based
aggregation would not necessarily yield results more "pro-rich" than
those already produced by the current political process. A
compromise approach would make the data publicly available in both
forms, first aggregated by tax dollars, and separately aggregated on a
one-person one-vote principle. 77 The political process could then
178
decide which, if either, of these compilations should inform policy.
It is even possible that a backlash could develop against "the rich
people's 179
budget" if it transparently appears to embody "pocketbook
voting."'
A related concern is that taxpayers, as a group, are not necessarily
representative of the nation as a whole, because not everyone pays
federal income taxes. Linking the interface to tax return filings will
thus automatically miss a segment of the population that is especially
vulnerable and politically underrepresented.180 However, the fact that
176. We thank David Schizer for prompting us to focus on the implications of this design
choice.
177. To alleviate the concerns about non-taxpayers, we might allow any person eligible to
vote to submit an allocation, even when they do not file a tax return. This would be counted in
the latter aggregation, but not in the former one.
178. There are a number of other details that we would have to address. For example, we
might permit married couples filing joint returns to create separate allocations for one-half of
the tax payment amount, or choose to allocate the entire amount together (counting as two
separate allocations for purposes of the one-person, one-vote budget).
179. See, e.g., David 0. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, Self-Interest in Americans' Political
Opinions, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 147, 156-57 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing

and questioning the "pocketbook voting" hypothesis).
180. The specific "voice" mechanism contemplated here-a computer interface-might
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many people of limited means file tax returns to claim refunds and to
receive the Earned Income Tax Credit significantly alleviates this
concern. Of course, many of these people do not pay any positive
amount in federal income taxes,18 1 which raises the issue of the
appropriateness of a "dollar votes" approach even more sharply.
Another interesting question is whether government should permit
all allocational moves, or whether it should disallow certain moves.
For example, the interface might prevent a taxpayer from reducing
the amount of money allocated to debt service, or the interface might
allow the taxpayer to do this if she chooses, but only after responding
to a pop-up warning about the risk and significance of government
default. We tend to favor the latter approach, because we fear that
moves in the direction of carving out "untouchable" categories of
expenditures could dilute taxpayer voice and its corresponding ability
to serve as a proxy for taxpayer control.
Our proposed interface would provide taxpayers with a form of
voice presently unavailable to them. While taxpayers are already free
to engage in political action, the realities of bundled choices and
interest group politics make any real involvement illusory. Likewise,
the current system severely limits taxpayers' ability to seek judicial
relief regarding the use of their tax monies. 8 2 In some tax-related
contexts, the ability to exercise voice appears quite important to
taxpayer perceptions, and there is reason to suspect it might be
significant in this context as well. 83 At any rate, there is nothing
84 lost,
and potentially much gained, by investigating these questions.
also seem to leave out those on the wrong side of the "digital divide." However, it would be
possible to address this concern by setting up public tax centers at libraries and other
community centers that would provide free use of computers and software for this purpose, and
by providing paper forms in which respondents could list desired allocations.
181. The Earned Income Tax Credit is a "refundable" tax credit, which means that eligible
recipients receive the credit even when it exceeds any positive amount of taxes. ROSEN, supra
note 2, at 166.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169-70 (1974) (discussing
taxpayer standing requirements).
183.

Richard Lempert, Commentary, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND

ENFORCEMENT 251, 254 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) ("Probably the strongest and most powerful
factor that leads to judgments of fair procedure is 'voice,' the ability to state one's case or tell a
story to a decision maker").
184. Cf id. (suggesting that modifying tax returns "so that they provided an opportunity to
speak to the govemment" would be "an experiment well worth doing").
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CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of tax aversion is elusive, yet of great practical
and theoretical significance. We have attempted to convince readers
of the value that might be gained from employing empirical tools to
pin down the phenomenon, to understand its constituent parts, and to
evaluate how it might be alleviated. Because the paper seeks to open
up new lines of inquiry that can inform tax design, this "conclusion"
concludes nothing; we offer merely a starting point.
We close with a brief note about interdisciplinarity. This paper,
like many interdisciplinary papers involving law, seems at first blush
to reflect a unidirectional notion of interdisciplinarity. On this view,
the law (which has plenty of unsolved problems but few answers of
its own) eagerly pries open the treasure chests of other disciplines
and attempts to pilfer transferable lessons from them. The
anthropological and sociological literature, however, comes with
built-in warnings attached, reminding us that findings in one context
do not readily transfer to other contexts; anthropology is, in a sense,
all about understanding the ways in which context shapes human
choice. Anthropology's contributions to federal taxation cannot be
realized in a manner consistent with the discipline's own operating
principles until anthropologists begin to apply the tools of the
discipline to those specific cultural contexts.
Thus, this paper identifies a gap not only in legal scholarship but
also in the anthropological literature. One might think that
anthropological studies would have thoroughly covered aspects of
human and societal life as integral as taxpaying and public finance,
but this is not the case. Where we expected to find a rich stock of
accumulated theory and empirical data, we encountered mostly bare
cupboards. 185 Our ambitious hope, then, is that this paper advances
not only public policy dialogue about taxation and legal scholarship,
185. Recent anthropological studies have examined cultural and social dynamics among
welfare recipients and social workers. See, e.g., Jo Anne Schneider, Introduction: Social
Welfare and Welfare Reform, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 705 (2001). Still, broader issues of
taxation and spending remain new terrain to be addressed.
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but also helps to advance anthropological studies by opening up a
relatively untapped field of inquiry that seems to have significant
implications for the discipline.

